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3Foreword
Foresight is an important tool to help us face the future with confidence, understand 
opportunities and risks, and help us develop our medium to long term strategies for research, 
science and innovation policy. It takes many guises: trends, signals, scenarios, visions, road-
maps and plans are all parts of the tool-box for looking to the future.  In addition to these 
tools, using foresight requires an in-depth reflection on the policy implications and related 
scenarios. 
This report ‘The Knowledge Future: intelligent policy choices for Europe 2050’ is an excellent 
example of such a reflection. Europe’s research, innovation and higher education systems are 
the foundation of our economic and social prospects, shaping our ability to tackle numerous 
challenges at both local and international level. 
Globalisation, demographic changes and technological advances pose important challenges 
and opportunities for research and innovation in Europe. By reflecting on the trends and 
articulating scenarios, this report helps us think differently about European policies in the 
medium to long term.
In Europe we need to:
• Create the necessary conditions to capitalise on the results of research and      
innovation;
• Boost excellence in cutting-edge, fundamental research;
• Reinforce our international engagement through science diplomacy.
On this basis, I have set my priorities to be Open Innovation, Open Science, and Open to the 
World.  
I hope that this report will contribute to discussions on how research and innovation can 
contribute to a stronger economy and a better society for all. 
Carlos MOEDAS
Commissioner for Research
Science and Innovation
European Commission 
4Summary and Policy 
recommendations
How do ideas become reality? The whole process of transforming knowledge - creating it, sharing 
it, and using it - has become important to policy makers. They see it as connected somehow 
with how rich we are, how competitive Europe can be, how healthy or happy our citizens are, 
and how sustainable our world will be. This report to the European Commission, by a diverse 
group of academics, policy experts and private-sector representatives, looks at the future of this 
knowledge engine – towards the challenges of 2050. It recommends steps to ensure that, through 
maintenance of a robust system for transforming knowledge into action, Europe’s citizens are 
better off, rather than worse off, in that distant future.
Vital to that system is the ‘knowledge triangle.’ The acts of learning, discovering and innovating 
all go together, like three pistons in an economic engine. Education, research and innovation; 
universities, laboratories and companies; academics, researchers and entrepreneurs – all are part 
of an engine that, if well managed, creates wealth, jobs, growth and, if one is an optimist, social 
progress. Europe today has many such triangles, of varying strength, specialisation and fecundity. 
They include very large, multi-disciplinary agglomerations of big universities, companies and 
agencies; specialised but no-less dynamic sectoral hubs; and rising new centres. Increasingly, they 
interconnect: Indeed, EU initiatives like the Framework Programmes or, within them, the European 
Institute of Innovation and Technology, include linkage as an aim. But despite these centres’ 
individual vibrancy, many policy makers share an overriding concern that they aren’t enough: That 
competition from the US, China, India and elsewhere risks leaving Europe behind – and that the 
difficulties coordinating and managing a European response are enormous.
At least three major trends are destabilising the status quo in Europe’s knowledge system. 
Globalisation is one. As the world gets more inter-connected, and economic competition expands, 
the way we learn, discover or innovate will change, and the impact will hit home faster and harder. 
Demographic change is another. The move to cities, the ageing population, the shifts in family size 
and social norms – all will alter what we expect and can do in education, research and innovation. 
And technological change is accelerating. Just 35 years ago came text editors. Now: gene editing. 
5By 2050, what next? Each invention, coming faster and faster, changes not only our society and 
economy, but also our expectations and the way we work in education, science and business.
How will we cope with these changes? Can we continue to play a key role in the global generation, 
spread and use of knowledge? Can we use the knowledge system to improve our lives, integrate 
our societies, preserve and improve our environment? Those are the questions the group asked, 
as it looked towards 2050. To crystallise the challenges and opportunities, it created two possible 
views of the future: one positive, one negative. These are not forecasts or formal scenarios. These 
are plausible sketches of the future with one purpose: To dramatise the importance of making 
wise policy choices, and to suggest what those choices might be.
Option A: European Success
It is 2050, and Europe and its knowledge economy are competitive. Clusters of well-funded, 
internationally renowned universities are thriving in many of Europe’s important and growing 
cities, in strong partnerships with regional institutions. Education is ‘in’; never before have so 
many wanted so much from teachers: new skills, new jobs, new capacity to cope with rapid 
change, new perspectives for leading fulfilled lives – from cradle to grave. This growing demand 
for continual education has prompted new efficiencies: course modules shared within university 
clusters, online and artificial intelligence-based teaching, specialisation within institutions public 
and private. Educational games, at which European designers excel, are a vast market segment. In 
business, open innovation is now the dominant mode: multinationals, SMEs, universities and many 
new actors – foundations, NGOs, individuals (many retired) - work together in fast-changing global 
networks to solve global problems. Europe’s mega-cities, with their unique sense of community 
identity and involvement, are a focus for innovation; ‘Paris original’ – or Warsaw or Athens – has 
become a new kind of global brand. Meanwhile, automation and data-intensive science have 
changed the nature of doing research. We have moved from open science to radical open access: 
all kinds of new actors are rushing into the research game, especially in astronomy, ecology, 
climate and other fields that attract strong public interest. Europe’s research infrastructures are the 
new cathedrals of this science: Open to all, supported by all. Frontier science is a competitive, EU-
wide affair led by an enlarged European Research Council, while regional disparities in innovation 
capacities are countered through separately administered regional development funds. Indeed, 
EU institutions generally are strengthened; as the regions and cities have climbed in importance – 
Europe’s growing laboratories of democracy – so the coordinating role of EU institutions has risen. 
Multinational tax avoidance is tamed, strengthening public treasuries everywhere.  Where Europe 
once produced 30% of the world’s ideas, it has more than held its own as Asia rose; it is moving 
towards 40%. Many of its industries are competitive, building on healthy SMEs. Its universities are 
strong, its citizens fulfilled – and its core values, such as equality, openness, social inclusion and 
environmental responsibility, are upheld.
Option B: Europe misses out
It is 2050, and Europe is a victim of megatrends beyond its control.  Automation and globalisation 
have triggered mass unemployment, social exclusion, discontent. Service bots, machine learning, 
ubiquitous sensing – what’s left for the humans to do? Inequality is higher than ever; new 
creative jobs are constantly evolving from new technologies, but they are only for the skilled 
few. Politically, Europe has fragmented into a coalition of rich and poor regions with minimal 
coordination. A Northern Arc has maintained free movement of goods, services, and people; other 
parts of Europe are isolated. Multinational companies, and wealthy individuals, use global markets 
6and digital technologies to avoid tax. Public treasuries are impoverished; and universities and 
labs depend heavily on private funding – which means new ideas and talent are controlled by 
the wealthy and powerful. A few great universities dominate; many weaker, regional universities 
have closed or merged. Automation has also swept across the educational system, with online 
certifications normal and augmented cognition technologies starting to appear – and finding 
favour with big companies wanting fast, cheap graduates. In research, the top-cited scientists 
are in hot demand – often hired by multinationals in a kind of perpetual ‘consultancy without 
borders.’ These companies, on which public labs and universities rely for major funding, get early 
access to the real discoveries and use their influence to steer the remaining public funds towards 
their projects; that’s what makes for jobs and growth, they argue. Asian research is stronger now, 
and an embattled US has thrown up new trade barriers to Europe. Mobility is diminished. A few 
European companies are rich and smart enough to stay global champions; but generally Europe’s 
economic base has hollowed out, and the few innovators its universities produce quickly move 
abroad. Innovation is without borders; supply chains form and dissemble rapidly – making long-
term regional development more difficult than ever. Europe looks inward, fears the future, and 
sees its values gradually discredited.
Looking at what differentiates the two scenarios, three broad principles guide our thinking about 
what Europe’s knowledge institutions and governance must do to prosper: they require openness, 
experimentation, and cooperation. They are needed to counteract three threats: structural 
unemployment and inequality, funding shortfalls, and a skills crisis. In what follows, we elaborate 
on the principles and actions needed to ensure that 2050 is a place worth being – for all Europeans. 
Our policy recommendations follow from those principles.  
Policy Recommendations
Principle 1: An open knowledge system in Europe
If we are to adapt to coming challenges, our knowledge system must be open. This goes beyond 
today’s open access or open science initiatives, to include the classroom and the marketplace, new 
infrastructures and a new intellectual property regime.
a. Invest more in research infrastructures. Experiment with different funding models (e.g. 
programmes for building research infrastructures). Promote openness of research infrastructures 
for teaching and learning, innovation, and citizen science.
b. Promote open access to data and data literacy – two interrelated goals necessary for, among 
other things, citizen participation in science and technology policy. Continue to promote public 
engagement with science. Promote citizen participation in research programmes and develop 
assessment systems for citizen science. Support models of crowdfunding for research.
c. Create a European Knowledge Space to function as a knowledge pool for addressing societal 
challenges by making accessible all publicly funded research results (data and publications) 
from all European labs and teams.   An on-line framework open to all citizens for research, 
analysis, debate and sharing, this will enable policy-makers, business leaders, scientists, 
7technologists and the general public to access all knowledge available, to exchange information 
and to deliberate options for addressing societal challenges.  An integrated framework of 
policies, incentives and ICT tools to permit greater sharing, debate and participation in the 
results and challenges of fast-changing science and technology to address societal challenges, 
it can form a core objective of Framework Programmes of the future. 
d. Rethink intellectual property – opening the debate beyond the small world of IP experts 
to include researchers, consumers, the developing world and others. While private reward for 
private investment in knowledge remains a basic principle of our economy, that principle is 
challenged more and more often by new technologies, globalisation and demographic changes. 
Time to think again.
Principle 2: Flexibility and experimentation in innovation
Adapting to change also requires greater freedom of action – to experiment locally and regionally, 
in different social and economic groupings, with new business and social models. 
a. Build stronger regional innovation ecosystems piggy-backing on urbanisation processes. 
Support place-based knowledge triangles, building on open innovation principles. Promote 
inter-institutional cooperation by encouraging public institutions to make available research 
infrastructures to firms that need it and develop cooperation with them.
b. Support the autonomy of universities. Strengthen them by encouraging diverse income 
streams for the diverse activities in which they engage - including collaborations with technology 
companies to invent new types of education. Encourage regional and national government 
investment in universities.
c. Stimulate experimentation in the economy and society: name new challenges, create prizes 
for strategically positioned results between the current state of science and long-range EU 
policy goals. Stimulate social crowdfunding platforms, and support charities that organise them 
by, for instance, providing a more favourable VAT status for foundations. 
d. Promote experimentation in social and environmental policy. For instance, undertake a major 
initiative for society to figure out how to move from its obsession with economic growth to 
a higher regard for sustainability. Create a new regional fund for sustainability to support 
the experiments. Support new economic analysis, ‘well-being’ indicators, labelling and other 
attempts to help change the way we, as a consuming society, think and act. This would require 
unprecedented engagement of the social sciences and humanities in policy development. 
Principle 3: European-level cooperation
A single market of scale requires some form of coordination for policy, regulation and support. 
Europe’s knowledge system will be both a contributor to and a beneficiary of a coherent EU 
framework. Better to hang together than hang separately.
a. The EU has a role in creating a single market for knowledge – the European Research Area. 
The ERA needs high levels of public investment, research infrastructures linked to regional 
smart-specialisation, and a level playing field for competition between researchers and between 
institutions.
8b. Link knowledge-related policy with that for cohesion and social welfare to deal with 
unemployment and to ensure citizen participation. For example, launch a public education and 
innovation programme on how to make a living in a sharing economy, or to train retirees to find 
markets and students for their skills. Such measures, to keep citizens plugged into the fast-
changing economy, can make a big difference over the next 35 years.
c. Build the European Research Council into a core institution of the European Research Area: 
fundamental research is where the public good and European scale intertwine. The ERC, besides 
funding frontier research, could play a role in science policy and coordinating national, regional 
and local level funders of basic research. It can be a ‘science hub’ for Europe. 
d. Encourage efforts to update educational curricula and certificate programmes – to adapt 
them for an age of fast-changing jobs. This would include reinvigorating the Bologna process to 
modernise educational standards across the Union, while ensuring increasingly flexible curricula. 
Encourage modular structures for student choice, interdisciplinary learning, and individualised 
curricula.
e. Identify some truly inspiring Grand Projects for 2050, that really do reflect the aspirations 
of our citizens. By way of example, this could include such simple, obvious targets as curing 
dementia or eradicating all infectious diseases. Or it could include a sustainability project of the 
sort described earlier: Harness the social sciences, humanities, civil society and all other parts of 
society to discover how to shift our societal focus from eternal growth to sustainable wellbeing. 
f. Set ambitious global goals and positions for global problems, building on national and EU 
research efforts.
Plus: Funding and the tax base
Knowledge isn’t cheap. The investments we will need for education, research and innovation over 
the next 35 years will be substantial – and, as so much of these involve a public good, a public role 
in financing them will need to continue. Europe needs to safeguard its tax base. Tax-avoidance 
by multinationals or wealthy individuals is a growing problem, due in part to globalisation and 
technology. 
We urge the creation of better systems to monitor cross-border commerce and taxation. This 
could be a new initiative within Horizon 2020. But more importantly, we recommend a gradual 
tightening of the links between fiscal policy and policy for research, innovation and education.
* * *
The principles enumerated above are very broad – but then, the perspective of this group has 
been broad, and far. When thinking about the future of the knowledge system, one is inevitably 
drawn into wider considerations: of social structures, environmental impact, Europe’s place in the 
globe. With this regard, far from being a minor corner of EU policy, the combination of research, 
education and innovation reaches very quickly into every field of policy. Making the right choices 
will matter very much in the years ahead; our sketches of the future highlight that fact.
In the end, we are what we believe. Despite our many differences, Europeans share some basic 
values:  the rights of the individual, openness to new ideas and peo`ples, égalité and social 
solidarity, environmental responsibility to future generations – and a respect for knowledge. If we 
are to prosper in 2050, our policy choices will reinforce those values. 
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Introduction
“Rien ne gâte la confiance comme la prévoyance d’un changement.”
 - Napoléon, Mémoires, 1821
We live in a world of growing unpredictability. Accelerating technological change empowers 
individuals and organisations to be far more productive, and destructive, than ever before. 
National and other traditional boundaries are eroding as connections – virtual and physical, for 
commerce or culture – multiply among individuals, organisations and regions. Demographically, 
where we live, with whom we live, and how long we live are all changing fast. Even as physical 
distance becomes less important to us, our growing tendency to cluster in those parts of the 
planet most challenged for resources in general and for food and energy in particular make it ever 
harder to forecast anything – from war to peace. Even the problems may change:  by 2050 what 
we view as global challenges may not be as we currently know them.
For Europe, its research, innovation and higher education system - the Knowledge Triangle - lies 
at the core of its economic and social prospects. It shapes our ability to meet challenges and 
promote the welfare, security and wellbeing of our citizens. It permits us to adapt to change. From 
ancient Athens to modern Paris or Cambridge, knowledge defines society; the system by which 
we create, preserve, share and apply that knowledge is vital. Yet, today, we see that system under 
mounting stress: of money, technology, demographics, and globalisation.
This report explores how this knowledge system may evolve by 2050. It draws recommendations 
for immediate policy action in Europe, so that the outcome is what we wish for rather than what 
we are handed.
Foresight is a growing discipline. At the basis of this report lies a great deal of foresight work 
by others – a synthesis of current thinking developed under European Union programmes, 
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, national agencies and private 
organisations1.  This work has underpinned the deliberations of our expert group, a diverse body of 
academics, policy analysts, and private-sector representatives. Our disciplines include economics, 
1 The group’s report builds on work in EU projects: Forward Visions on the European Research Area (VERA) http://eravisions.eu/;   Research 
and Innovation Futures 2030 (RIF) http://www.rif2030.eu/;  and on OECD work on the Future of Hihger Education:  http://www.oecd.org/edu/
skills-beyond-school/ceri-universityfuturesfourscenariosforhighereducation.htm; in the context of globalization: http://www.oecd .org/edu/
ceri/hig hereducationto2030volume2 globalisation.htm; and of demographic changes: http:// www.oecd.org/ education/skills-beyond-school 
highereducationto2030vol1demography.htm.  In addition to this background, the Expert Group would like to thank, for their help in surveying 
the field of foresight,  Dominique Guellec of the OECD, Anne Stenros of KONE Corp., Jerome Glenn of the Millennium Project, and Simon Roy and 
Nikolaos Kastrinos of the European Commission. 
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computer science, education, science and innovation policy, foresight, journalism and more. We 
met periodically in Brussels over four months to debate how Europe’s knowledge system could 
evolve through 2050, and what the European Union should do about it. 
To capture the spectrum of potential developments and options, the group constructed two 
scenarios: one of European success in the turbulent world of the next 35 years, and one of Europe 
missing out on the opportunities of the future. The scenarios are neither quantitative economic 
modelling nor systems dynamics analysis – although information from modelling exercises has 
been considered in their construction. They are, rather, narratives that the group finds plausible 
and instructive. They highlight important decision points and directions – «lines to take» - that 
could make a difference for the future of research, innovation and higher education in Europe, and 
through that, for the future of Europe as a whole.
In this report, the first chapter provides a short description of our baseline: What is the Knowledge 
Triangle today? The second chapter analyses three megatrends that we believe will most influence 
the knowledge system: globalisation, accelerating technological change, and population change. 
The third and fourth chapters present our two scenarios. And the final chapters summarise the 
policy conclusions we draw from the scenarios, and how they relate to our common values as 
Europeans.
The scenarios are not meant to be parts of a binary reality: a menu of two possibilities from which 
we choose one.  Europe is a big place and parts of the positive or negative scenarios may play out 
simultaneously in different areas. The important point about the scenarios is that they highlight 
policy choices, and the challenges and opportunities that may derive from them.  As always, 
history is a result partly of events beyond our control, and partly of the choices – smart or stupid 
– that we make. With this report, we hope for the best.
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1. Transforming knowledge
How do you make money from an idea? How do you turn knowledge into wealth, wellbeing and 
social progress?  These questions matter more and more, as economy and society embrace 
accelerating technological change, and the importance of knowledge rises. 
Theories abound. There’s the courageous inventor model: A Babbage or Marconi, through force of 
character chasing a private vision of computation or radio that, sooner or later, proves worthwhile. 
There’s breakthrough science: A Watson and Crick, pointing us down a path that others, more 
practically minded, develop over 60 years into a new, life-saving industry. There’s the invention 
factory, like Edison’s Menlo Park laboratory or Bosch’s Stuttgart workshop: Pick an economically 
important problem, and put a professional team on its solution that draws ideas from wherever 
they can be bought, borrowed or stolen. There are more theories, but most seem too simplistic – 
mere cartoons of how knowledge is transformed to action.
In recent years, however, a more complex model has come to dominate policy discussion in 
Europe: the knowledge triangle. The idea itself is simple: the acts of learning, discovering and 
innovating all go together, like three pistons in an economic engine. Education, research and 
innovation; universities, laboratories and companies; teachers, scientists and entrepreneurs – all 
are part of a system that, if well managed, creates wealth, jobs, growth and, if one is an optimist, 
social progress. The idea grew from observation of the way universities and companies were 
interacting in Boston and San Francisco in the 1970s and 1980s, and began to spread in Europe 
with studies of similar, albeit smaller, phenomena in Cambridge, Gothenburg and a few other 
university towns1.  In the first decade of this century, as Europe with its Lisbon Agenda strove 
(unsuccessfully) to become “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in 
the world,”2 the triangle model became entrenched in policy circles. By now, it is orthodoxy, a way 
of thinking embedded in the EU’s flagship research and innovation programme, Horizon 2020, as 
well as policy for education, research and innovation in many member-states.
2   See, for instance, “The Cambridge Phenomenon,” an influential 1985 report by a UK consulting firm, Segal Quince & Partners, commissioned 
originally to help promote the city. Similar, smaller studies were done in the 1980s of a few other European cities.
3 European Council. “Presidency Conclusions”, 23-24 March 2000. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/
ec/00100-r1.en0.htm
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But how does the triangle work, exactly? And what policies would make it work better? These are 
tough questions.
They are tough, first, because of a widespread view that Europe faces an «innovation gap» with 
other advanced countries. This perspective is not new.  It can be found, for example, in the 
Colonna Report published in 19703. But over the last 15 years, it has been documented in a growing 
number of studies and indicators – of patents, scientific citations, and R&D investment. Like most 
received wisdom, it isn’t a universal truth; in fact, by some measures, Europe is doing better than 
the US. But the new challengers are China, South Korea, India and other rising economies; as their 
innovation investments have risen, the US and European share of global R&D has for the first 
time fallen below 50%. So the innovation gap has risen on the European policy agenda. But the 
problem isn’t just competitiveness.  Threats like climate change, energy insecurity, unemployment 
and inequality in incomes, health and harmful exposures are rising. Politicians strive harder to 
improve Europe’s capacity to innovate its way out of these problems – but the perception persists 
that something isn’t quite right about the way the triangle is working in Europe.
Contribution of knowledge-intensive goods and services (1) to the trade balance
Source: Innovation Union Competitiveness Report 2013; Notes: (1) US, JP: Data were not available for all knowledge intensive sectors for all 
years. (2) Extra-EU27. (3) US, JP: 2005. (4) US: 2010. 
The questions are also tough, however, because the policy levers are hard to grasp in Europe. In 
research, the EU has some options. It acquired legal competence for research, in parallel with the 
member-states, in 1986 with approval of the Single European Act that provided the Union with 
new means to support its own programmes. With the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007 the EU powers 
were further strengthened by mention of a “European Research Area” – a kind of single market 
for ideas and their creators.  But EU power over higher education is considerably softer: Since 
the Treaty of Maastricht, education is an explicitly designated national competence. Innovation 
is mentioned in the EU Treaty in a chapter on industry, as one of the conditions necessary for 
competitiveness.  The result is a complex, ever-changing mix of national, sub-national and EU 
3 EC (1970) Industrial Policy of the European Community
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policies. Policy makers in Brussels speak of a Knowledge Triangle – but in fact, there are hundreds 
of them scattered across the EU, big or small, effective or useless, productive or wasteful. What 
works in one region may fail in another. Finding the right policy mix is difficult.
The knowledge system 
So what is this machine, this 
engine, efficient or not, that 
transforms knowledge into action?
Start with the most straightforward 
element, the research capacity. 
First, European Research is a 
collection of 28 national research 
systems with a relatively small 
overlay of EU coordination. Three 
countries – Germany, France and 
the UK – perform more than half 
the R&D in the EU; the Commission 
budget is barely 6% of the total. 
The degree of national commitment to R&D varies wildly, from more than 4% of gross domestic 
product to a statistically negligible fraction. The structure differs, from strong ministries dictating 
funding and policy from the top down, to bottom-up, peer-reviewed grant systems administered 
by politically independent research councils. Some members have politically important academies; 
some don’t. A few trends unite most, however: Among them, a growing interdependence as 
their researchers collaborate across EU and international borders; high mobility, with 56% of 
researchers having spent at least three months working abroad ; a growing interest in applying 
science to global problems like climate and security; and rising political attention to what science 
does. This can only be good: Witness the rising numbers of “citizen science” web sites and apps, 
whether counting birds or galaxies. It can also be difficult, as scientific issues from stem cells to 
genetic modification gain political charge. 
Institutionally, the research world is in constant turmoil. The number of research and research 
funding agencies has risen across Europe, and they often have specific policy missions such as 
renewable energy or non-communicable diseases. Foundations, patients’ groups and other new 
actors have entered the scene. At the same time, universities have become even more central 
to research than before, so much so that in Denmark government research centres have been 
absorbed by the universities.  In other countries government labs have been federating under 
umbrella organisations resembling the German Max Planck, Fraunhofer and Helmholtz societies. 
Of course, there are exceptions.  Austria, for example, has many small, independent research 
institutes in the social sciences and humanities.  And Greece, Spain and Italy do not have national 
research funding agencies outside government.   But there is a slow pressure towards convergence, 
as member-states compare notes on best practice and EU programmes rise in budget and political 
importance. 
And the nature of research is changing – in Europe as across the world. Individual institutions are 
challenged by growing competition and new technologies. Money matters more than ever: Research 
excellence often requires expensive equipment, and generates important income streams. Digital 
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technologies are changing what it means to publish results or protect ideas. Sharing data and 
infrastructure are becoming common. Science generally is more open, more collaborative and 
more productive than ever before; indeed, a whole new idea of research, sometimes called Science 
2.0 or more recently “Open Science”, is in development – a data-intensive, digitally connected 
approach to making and testing hypotheses, across borders and disciplines.
Distribution of mobile students in tertiary education by region of origin of the world %, 2010 (inbound and outbound 
mobility)
 
Source: European Commission on data from UNESCO
The education system across Europe is similarly diverse. There are about 4,000 higher education 
institutions in the EU serving more than 20 million students. They range from specialised schools 
to large universities, with a growing emphasis on training, or retraining, people for jobs in labour 
markets. Policy is set nationally, with relatively little EU involvement except in defined areas, such 
as study-abroad programmes or other forms of cross-border collaboration and intergovernmental 
exchange. Big countries have big educational systems; but, overall, gross national expenditures on 
higher education range between 1% and 2% of GDP and do not fluctuate much between years, 
although the squeezing effect of the recent financial crisis on education budgets has been visible, 
particularly for countries with budgetary deficits4. But that doesn’t mean it isn’t a sector roiled by 
powerful trends.
Often, education is viewed as a marketplace. Higher education has become ever-more global 
– and in that evolving market, Europe is No. 1, attracting 38% of international students and 
‘exporting’ 18%. In some European countries cash-strapped universities, no matter how famous, 
depend on international tuition to balance the books – adding a new tension to immigration policy, 
which of course can be also important for EU countries where universities do not charge tuition 
fees. A major trend has been for universities to diversify into innovation, managing intellectual 
property, spinning out companies and consulting to industry. Again, it helps fill budget gaps; 
but it also chases after the increasing amount of competitive applied research and innovation 
funding available from the EC and national governments pushing for faster economic growth. 
4   See: EURYDICE (2012) Funding of Education in Europe: the impact of the economic crisis http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/education/eurydice/
documents/thematic_reports/147EN.pdf
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And a combination of technology, labour demand and national policy has made some aspects of 
education look increasingly commercial. Today educational institutions certify skills to employers, 
assist in corporate recruitment and train multinational managers. They provide more personalised 
services to individual, paying students – of any age or background. Some European universities 
are privately owned, albeit not-for-profit. Indeed, education is even covered by World Trade 
Organisation rules.  
All these trends – viewing education as a market, with strong funding ties to commercial research 
and innovation – have put universities at the centre of the knowledge systems. In response, they 
have begun to behave strategically, forming international alliances and satellite campuses. With 
the arrival of MOOCs, and other forms of online provision, the reach of individual universities and 
courses grows and the conditions of competition among them changes. Strategies for attracting 
business investment and engaging in open innovation have become important parts of the identity 
of competitive universities.  
The final, innovation side of the triangle is harder to describe, as it is more diverse. Of course, 
a big part of it is in business – and that for Europe is a problem: generally speaking, there’s 
less business R&D than in the US, Japan or other major world powers. Indeed, for years, no 
matter what the prevailing policy, the EU has scraped along with a steadily poor 1% of GDP 
devoted to R&D funded by business, while China and other rising powers have surpassed it. 
The industry mix, labour policies, taxation, regulated or anti-competitive markets, foreign 
tax incentives – many reasons have been suggested for the unresponsiveness of European 
business. And the problem isn’t just with big companies: European start-ups and spin-
outs, despite their often-promising technologies, have trouble growing into global colossi. 
If successful, they are often absorbed by multinationals, for lack of growth capital in Europe. 
GERD financed by business enterprise as % of GDP, 2000-2011
 
 
Source: DG Research and Innovation - Economic Analysis Unit; Innovation Union Competitiveness Report 2013 Data: Eurostat, OECDNotes: (1) KR: There is a break 
in series between 2007 and the previous years. (2) JP: There is a break in series etween 2008 and the previous years. (3) US: (i) There is a break in series between 
2006 and the previous years; (ii) GERD financed by business enterprise does not include most or all capital expenditure.
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and develop our medicines. Second, new actors enter the picture: micro-companies, foundations, 
crowd-sourced ventures. With so many players, opportunities for both fruitful cooperation and 
bitter rivalry abound. On one hand, ‘open innovation’ has become trendy; closed, centralised 
corporate labs have given way to networked integrators of others’ ideas. On the other hand, 
intellectual property has never been more hotly defended; the ‘smartphone wars’ that have pit 
global ICT companies against one another in court, rather than in the market, are the latest 
example. Lastly, technology is changing the very definition of innovation. Consider: A Copenhagen 
architect designs a daring new building in Barcelona, collaborating online with Stuttgart materials 
experts on thermally efficient windows,  Palo Alto programmers on ‘smart building’ services for 
automatic control, Tianjin solar engineers for more-efficient power panels – and then innovative 
new companies from across the world move in as tenants. Which of these is the most important 
innovator? 
The knowledge triangle: Strong partnerships
With apologies to Tolstoy: unhappy countries are all different; happy countries are all the same – 
at least when it comes to innovation. There is, across Europe, huge regional variation in innovation 
performance. But the leading countries share a number of strengths in their innovation systems: 
Resilient economies, dynamic companies, big R&D budgets, open markets, well-trained engineers 
and scientists and strong schools, to name a few obvious advantages. How much of these 
advantages are cause, and how much effect, of a strong innovation system is open to debate. But 
what is clear is that a lot of things have to go fairly right, all around the same time, for success. 
The combination of factors matters: the innovation leaders have a balanced national research, 
higher education and innovation system that performs well. 
EU innovation performance 
Source: Innovation Union Scoreboard 2015
How does that work? They have many, and varied, innovation ecosystems, in which people have 
incentives to connect, learn, adapt and change – across the conventional boundaries of laboratory, 
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just a campus. Also needed are strong local companies with specialities that can succeed in big 
markets; investors willing to bet on local entrepreneurs; enlightened government; and much more. 
Take just one example: the Stockholm/Uppsala region. It is the most R&D-intensive in Sweden, 
covering all areas of technology – but its life sciences cluster is particularly strong. It includes five 
universities – most famously, Karolinska Institutet, which names the Nobel Prize in Medicine or 
Physiology. The region has over 600 life sciences companies, two university hospitals, numerous 
innovation support services, and dedicated government innovation agencies. The universities train 
doctors, nurses, researchers and entrepreneurs. They host company offices, large and small, right 
on campus, making academic/industrial collaboration physically easy. They provide new leads for 
biomarkers and treatment strategies that the companies can develop into products or services. 
They are also extremely well-funded, getting 78% of their budgets in direct grants from the Swedish 
government. Almost a third of EU-supported life sciences projects have at least one partner from 
the Stockholm-Uppsala region. The government has invested in supporting technologies including 
electronic patient records, biobanks and health care databases. There is a distinctive intellectual 
property regime in Sweden that allows researchers and scientists to retain the patent rights in 
their work5.  A number of local investment funds, supported by Sweden’s richest families, actively 
invest seed money in the area. 
The outcome? Despite its small size, Sweden ranks 12th in the world in output of clinical trial 
research and 6th in most-cited papers. Life sciences companies in the capital region employ 
23,000, equivalent to 60% of Sweden’s workforce in the sector. In 2013, 49 Swedish companies 
had at least 81 clinical-stage projects, representing a significant pool for potential collaboration. 
Of course, Stockholm is unusual – but not impossibly so. World-class innovation clusters thrive 
around Cambridge University, the University of Oxford and the large group of London universities; 
around KU Leuven, LMU and TU Munich, TU Eindhoven and many others. Clusters are growing 
around universities in Prague, Warsaw, Milan and Barcelona.  Some have a paramount local 
industry: Turin is for cars, Toulouse for planes. Some are funded privately, for the most part; others 
revolve around big government labs or programmes. Some have had decades of growth; others, 
especially in the East, are only now building or rebuilding. 
To what extent are these really knowledge triangles, or just happy clusters of regional innovation? 
In truth, the dynamics of these systems are not entirely clear – but we can all read in them the 
effects of a good mix of education, research, entrepreneurship and policy.  
The EU role
So what is to be done, if we want more knowledge engines like those? Clearly, national policies 
matter greatly; but if we wish to spread the success across Europe, the EU institutions are bound 
to play a role. So, we offer a review of EU policies in this field that have been a key force in the 
shaping of a European innovation system. 
The EU institutions have been pushing to improve Europe’s international competitiveness. As 
mentioned previously, its Lisbon Agenda (later, the Lisbon Strategy) in 2000 set a grand goal 
of making the EU “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world 
capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion’’ 
5 There is a long, and so far unresolved, policy debate over whether such ‘professor’s privilege’ IP rules help or hinder innovation in the few 
countries, such as Sweden, that have them. The more common, American-style model is for the university to own the rights, but give the profes-
sor a share of the rewards.
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by 2010. It targeted a near-doubling in R&D spending, to 3% of GDP – with projected payback of 
0.5% additional GDP growth and 400,000 extra jobs a year.  When that strategy failed for lack 
of investment, in 2010 the EU put forward another initiative, the Europe 2020 Strategy6 with a 
number of flagship initiatives to achieve ‘’smart, sustainable and inclusive growth’’. As part of 
that, Horizon 2020, Europe’s framework programme for research and innovation, has boosted 
European funding for the period 2014-2020 to €77 billion.
A number of policy initiatives go along with these efforts. The Innovation Union flagship initiative, 
adopting a broad approach to innovation that includes not only bringing to market new products 
but also new processes, systems and approaches, aims at building on the uniqueness of Europe’s 
values and need for innovation. The European Research Area aims at creating a genuine single 
market for knowledge, research and – more recently – innovation, enabling researchers, institutions 
and businesses to circulate, compete and co-operate across borders. Moreover, the new rules for 
the EU’s Regional Cohesion Policy for 2014-2020 aim at making innovation a priority for all 
European regions, supporting “Smart Specialisation Strategies” to create knowledge-based jobs 
and growth not only in leading research and innovation hubs but also in less developed and rural 
areas of Europe. 
In education, there are parallel initiatives.  Education and Training 2020 has set as targets that at 
least 40% of those aged 30 to 34 should have completed some form of higher education (also a 
headline figure for Europe 2020), at least 15% of adults should participate in lifelong learning, and 
at least 20% of higher education graduates should have spent some time studying abroad. The 
ERASMUS+ programme supports learning mobility of individuals across EU countries, cooperation 
for innovation and exchange of good practices across EU higher education institutions and the 
world of work, and education policy reform. In the context of implementing the Lisbon Strategy, 
the European Commission has proposed since 20067  that the EU should by 2015 devote at least 
2% of GDP (including both public and private funding) to a modernised higher education sector. 
This has been neither attained nor retained as a target. The EU’s current Modernisation of Higher 
Education Agenda8  has proposed a framework of reforms to improve the quality and quantity 
of graduates, the governance and funding mechanisms supporting excellence, the knowledge 
triangle, the mobility of staff and students and the internationalisation of higher education. The 
intergovernmental Bologna process and the creation of a European Higher Education Area are 
also important steps towards enhancing the international competitiveness and attractiveness of 
Europe’s higher education and facilitate mobility of students and staff. 
In addition to these broad efforts, the European Institute of Innovation and Technology, or 
EIT, has been an initiative with EU funding to fully integrate all three sides of the Knowledge 
Triangle (higher education, research and business) by way of so-called Knowledge and Innovation 
Communities (KICs), international consortia of universities, firms, research organisations and 
other stakeholders that aim to advance knowledge and innovation in important fields. So far, KICs 
have been set up in the fields of Climate, Health, ICT, Energy and Raw Materials; more domains are 
set to follow. Having been founded in 2008 the EIT has become part of the Horizon 2020 package, 
and constitutes an important experiment in EU research and innovation policy-making, in which 
the EU gets directly involved with the design of institutional structures of the delivery of research, 
innovation and higher education in the European Union. 
That’s a lot of policy. But, as noted earlier, its impact is limited in scope - to areas specifically 
defined by treaty - and in the total effect: the European economy has yet to innovate itself out of 
6 European Commission COM (2010), Europe 2020. A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth.    
7 COM (2006) 30 final of 25/01/06.
8 COM (2011) 567 final
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the crisis and investments are stagnating. Across the EU, member-states’ budgets and policies 
dominate. But now, a series of megatrends – disruptive, powerful – are roiling the worlds of 
education, research and innovation. And the global economic crisis has hurt Europe and its regions. 
To maintain its economic prosperity and social welfare in 2050, Europe needs to improve its 
innovation performance, close the innovation gap with competing countries, and reduce regional 
disparities in innovation performance. Action will require a complex mix of European, national 
and regional policies, to create successful ecosystems for innovation. But how will these systems 
evolve in the decades ahead? What is the role of Europe in the future evolutions? And what should 
Europe do in order not to miss out on the future? 
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2. Megatrends 2050
A review of major forces shaping Europe’s innovation potential
Europe’s ability to innovate depends on many things: its universities, companies and research labs, 
to start. But it also depends, in a more profound way, on its ability to turn the great forces shaping 
the world to its advantage. Over the past generation, a mini-industry has grown to understand the 
‘megatrends’ reflecting these forces; the list of them varies by forecaster and objective, from the 
World Bank with an economic slant to the CIA with a security interest. But for knowledge creation 
and use, a few megatrends seem particularly important:
● Globalisation. As the world gets more inter-connected, and economic competition expands, 
the way we learn, discover or innovate will change, and the impact will hit home faster and 
harder. 
● Demographic change. The move to cities, the ageing population, the shifts in family size and 
social norms – all will change what we expect and can do in education, research and innovation. 
● Accelerating technology. Just 35 years ago came text editors. Now: gene editing. By 2050, 
what next? Each invention, coming faster and faster, changes not only our society and economy, 
but also the way we work in education, science and business. 
Here, we present a consensus view – what the experts most often say, from Washington to Paris 
and Tokyo – about these megatrends. Are they right? Check back in 2050 to find out. But they 
do appear to identify some of the most powerful forces affecting knowledge transformations in 
coming years.
1. Globalisation
The world is getting smaller. As it does so, 
interdependence will rise, power will shift, 
and new opportunities and risks will open 
up for individual citizens. 
With globalisation comes trade and growth, many economists say. The OECD expects global GDP 
to triple by 2050. That sounds impressive, but on an average, it actually implies a deceleration in 
annual growth rates from a peak of 4.3% to just under 2%1. 
1 OECD. “Economic Outlook and Global Interim Economic Assessment,” March 2015. http://www.oecd.org/eco/economicoutlook.htm
Trade is booming. From 20% in 2010, global exports 
as a percentage of GDP is expected to increase by 
2060 to about 33%, the OECD says.
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Resource and population constraints will bite. Still, good government will matter: Those growth 
rates can increase prosperity, improve living standards, and reduce global poverty – or, if badly 
managed, can magnify inequalities and destroy the environment. 
The OECD expects to see greater global economic convergence, with faster growth in developing 
regions than in advanced economies. The share in global GDP of advanced economies will fall 
while China’s and India’s share will rise by 20601. 
The global economy becomes multipolar: Shares in global GDP (at current PPPs) fall from 57% to 39% 
Source: OECD
1 OECD. ‘’Looking to 2060: A Global Vision of Long-Term Growth’’, OECD Economics Department Policy Notes, No. 15, November 2012.
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Chinese R&D intensity has been rising fast, and it caught up with Europe in 2012.  Given that R&D is  a high 
priority for the Chinese Government, we can expect that it may overtake the US, and by 2030 China could be the 
world’s biggest R&D investing country. 
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As that happens, economic power will shift from a unipolar to a multipolar system. Trade will also 
accelerate that shift. The combined contribution to global foreign direct investment of the US, EU, 
EFTA and Japan has already declined from almost 100% in the 1970s to 60% in 2012, while 
China’s outward investments have grown enormously to reach 12.1% of global FDI in 2012. 
The new balances in economic power are already being reflected in global governance, with China, 
India, Brazil and others playing a more forceful role in international finance, trade, development 
and climate change deliberations. But this does not necessarily mean that the world will eventually 
become ‘’flat’’. For one thing, this isn’t a static system: As China and India grow, their labour costs 
are rising and their current competitive advantage could diminish. Also, new actors emerge in 
the international and global scene, including regions, large cities, regional alliances, multinational 
enterprises and non-governmental organisations. In this changing context, the EU could see its 
capacity to control or influence events decline – but it need not be marginalised. That depends 
partly on the way the EU uses its native strengths in R&D, innovation, education and other factors 
that affect global competitiveness. 
Will borders vanish?
These macro considerations are somewhat theoretical, but on the scale of our daily lives and jobs 
we already see the very real effects of globalisation. From Amazon to Samsung, global brands and 
products are in our homes and hands. Migration – and conflict around it – is on the rise. Intellectual 
property, from music copyright to smartphone patents, is climbing on policy agendas; the White 
House has an “Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator” on staff. Innovation has moved 
beyond locality; behind any significant new service or product, a global chain of contributors – 
researchers, engineers, manufacturers, financiers, sales people – is at work. Education, at least 
at elite universities, is now a multi-cultural affair.  In the UK, one of the most international higher 
education systems in Europe and home to some of the world’s top universities, international 
students already account for 18% of enrolment2.  Science is most global of all: Today, about a fifth 
of all scientific articles are co-authored internationally – and for researchers in France, Germany 
and Britain, it’s about half. 
2 UK Council for International Student Affairs. http://www.ukcisa.org.uk/Info-for-universities-colleges--schools/Policy-research--statistics/
Research--statistics/International-students-in-UK-HE/
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Where does this stop? In some respects, it won’t: Wherever erasing borders adds value – cutting 
costs, speeding development, stimulating ideas – the practice will grow and grow. But there 
is also a countervailing force. Partly in backlash, we see local cultural preferences – in food, 
entertainment, primary and secondary schools – being asserted. Sustainable living preferences 
are popular, at least in Europe, in local products and bio agriculture. And regional pride is on the 
rise, from the Welsh language to Catalan independence movements. We cannot predict how the 
contradictions between globalisation and local pride will resolve themselves – but they will shape 
our society, and the way we develop and use knowledge, for generations to come.
2. Demographic change
World population will likely rise beyond 9.6 billion by 2050, despite – as with the economy 
– a slowing of the growth rate3. Most of the increase will occur in the developing world, and 
particularly in its cities. Age structures are also changing. The world’s median age is expected to 
increase from 28 in 2010 to 36 in 2050; and 
the proportion of those over 65 will grow from 
8% to 16% of the global population. This older 
population is more often female; women live 
longer. In developed regions, ageing will cause 
problems for labour market productivity, and 
the financing of social security, public health 
systems and taxation. Developing world 
regions are already seeing their rising young 
populations challenge their education systems’ 
capacity and opportunities for employment.  
Migration patterns will also change, say the 
forecasts, as several countries in developing 
regions attract more people. The economy 
isn’t the only driver: Climate change and 
environmental degradation will also play a 
growing role. Projections for climate change-
induced migration by 2050 vary significantly, 
ranging from 25 million to one billion people.  
Urbanisation
Urban areas in developing countries will absorb most of the global population increase, with 67% 
of people living in cities by 2050, doubling the current 2% of global land area covered by cities. 
We will see more megacities, informal settlements and, most likely, slums. But we will also see 
more pressure for efficient and sustainable use, re-use and mixed use of urban space. “Green’’ 
will be embraced by ‘’smart’’ concepts that bring together digital cities, products and technologies. 
The infrastructure of 2050 will be transformative, enhancing the resilience of cities and of their 
critical infrastructure systems.  
All this has profound political implications. Cities will become more powerful inside and outside 
their countries. Their revenues will increase and, most likely, they will take a stronger role in 
investment in research, innovation and higher education. 
3 See World population ageing, 2013, The United Nations, Population Division, The Department of Economic and Social Affairs, New York.
The UN’s demographic forecasts for Europe are dire:
• The share of the EU population under 15    
years old will fall from 16.4% in 2004 to 13.4% 
in 2050.
• The share of people 65 and older will rise from 
16.4% to 29.9%. 
• The share of the working age population 
(between 15 and 64) is expected to decrease 
from 67.2% to 56.7% - that is, a fall of 52 
million working age inhabitants. 
Whereas in 2004 there was one inactive person 
(young or elderly) for every two persons of working 
age, in 2050 there could be three inactive persons 
for every four of working age. 
Overall, with other regions growing fast, Europe’s 
share of the world’s population will shrink from 
11.9% today to 7.7% in 2050.
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A changing Europe
Europe’s population is also expected to change by 20504. The total population is expected to increase 
somewhat and then begin to decrease as the effect of net immigration will no longer outweigh the 
decrease that is due to the differential  fertility and mortality rates.  In 2004, Eurostat expected 
the turning point to be 2025, and in 2050 the population of EU-25 to be 1.5% lower than it was 
in 2004.  Currently Eurostat expects the population of EU-28 to have increased by about 4% by 
2050 and then begin to decline. In all forecasts EU population is expected to age considerably, and 
that raises challenges for European economies and societies. Governments will need to ensure 
the sustainability of public finances in Europe, in the face of large demographic challenges. In 
labour markets, the number of workers will 
shrink, and the ratio of elderly non-workers 
to workers will rise steeply. Overall, the OECD 
estimates that demographic trends will 
contribute to a fall in European annual GDP 
growth from 1.7% in 2020 to 1.3% in 2050. 
Gender dynamics and changing lifestyles
In Europe and other developed countries, changing gender dynamics, lifestyles and attitudes create 
new economic challenges and opportunities. Women’s participation, contribution and purchasing 
power have significantly increased in recent decades and are expected to grow further. Still, the 
share of women researchers in science and technology is low in most European countries, while 
female employees are vastly underrepresented in the workforce of tech companies. A 45% rise of 
independent professionals across Europe and an increase by 25% of freelancing mothers in the 
UΚ in the past two years indicate that casual, temporary work is here to stay. 
Lifestyles, preferences and attitudes of younger generations are changing. Household size is 
shrinking and DINKS (Double Income No Kids) are common. “Millennials” (i.e. those born 1981-
1996) appear to care more about having a good job than getting married or owning a house. 
Millennials say making the world a better place is a priority (64%), prefer self-employment (72%), 
a collaborative work-culture rather than a competitive one (88%), flexible work schedules (74%), 
and ‘’work-life integration’’5.    
4 See The Ageing Report, 2009 & 2012, The European Economy Series, European Commission
5 Source: Intelligence Group report, referred to by Anne Stenroos. Also see http://www.forbes.com/ sites/robasghar/2014/01/13/what-mil-
lennials-want-in-the-workplace-and-why-you-should-start-giving-it-to-them/
The most common household type in the EU-27 in 
2011 was the single person living alone, at 31.4% 
of the population. 
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3. Accelerating technological change
It has become a cliché by now: The pace of 
technological change is picking up. From 
radio to television to Internet to Web to.... 
From microbiology to biotech to genomics 
to synthetic biology to…. These ellipses will 
doubtless be replaced by an ever-faster 
sequence of developments: the semantic Web, 
augmented reality, quantum computing, 4-D 
printing and 3-D biological printing, nano-
robotic manufacturing and more. By 2050, 
we could have more drones than people. This 
pace of change is powered partly by the technologies themselves: data-sharing, open science, 
international collaboration are all made possible by our emerging ICT, for instance. And both 
governments and companies are pouring more money into R&D, although in Europe this is less so 
than in other parts of the world. Many multinational corporations now spend more on R&D than 
most OECD member-states.
But this is all somewhat predictable. More important is the potential of truly disruptive new 
technologies in society in coming decades. Take one example: artificial intelligence. This can appear 
an old story, researched since at least the 1970s and producing some impressive demonstrations 
(for instance, IBM’s Watson computer) but not much broad economic impact. That’s starting to 
change. In various projects around the world, researchers are developing expert, tablet computer 
systems to gather patient histories and symptoms in the waiting room, and offer a suggested 
diagnosis before the doctor even picks up a stethoscope; the impact of such a system, trained 
over many years by millions of doctor-patient interactions, would surely change the economics of 
healthcare globally. Education could be similarly transformed; personalised curricula could be a 
norm, and the industry of educational games and software could boom. 
Accelerating technological change brings an increasing scale of devices deployed in and around 
us, the new technologies making us better able to connect our digital and physical worlds through 
new sensors and communications. With this comes increasing automation to deal with ‘big data’ 
and its real-time analysis, a rise of machine-to-machine communication, and an increasing 
capability to influence the physical from the digital.  The adoption of the Web and social media 
has already shown what happens when there is mass engagement with the digital world, and with 
it empowerment of individuals who can create new digital products but also new social processes 
at large scale. We already see the emergence of the digital “crowd”, and any planning of a future 
Europe necessarily includes consideration of its digital counterpart.
What if we can…
• Grow meat without animals?
• Create floating, vertical farms in the sea?
• Create avatars to be our cyber-selves?
• Wear all day, every day biotech clothing?
• Make our growing cities eco-smart?
• Create jobs for all, in a global, digital employ-
ment marketplace?
• Print kidneys and cars?
• Develop a digital, collective intelligence?
What if… 
The impact of new technologies could be bad, as well as good. Imagine, for instance:
• Massive structural unemployment of over 50%, due to automation
• Lone-wolf terrorists using synthetic biology to deploy killer viruses
• New life forms leaking from labs harming agriculture and causing new diseases 
• Drug-resistant diseases increasing health care costs
• Attacks on nuclear power plants, water systems, and electric grids
• Cyber-insecurity and information warfare increasing paranoia and costs for all
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That’s just the start. How could these and related technologies change the way we think – quite 
literally?  For centuries, eyeglasses, microscopes and telescopes augmented our ability to see. Will 
chip implants and artificial intelligence one day soon back up memories, speed learning, and start 
to correct our mistakes and advise our conduct? Will our very understanding of consciousness 
change?
* * *
All these trends – globalisation, vanishing borders, urbanisation, technological change – will 
present a bewildering array of policy challenges. 
We can, in fact, give ourselves a good scare with all the dire possibilities. Temporary and part-time 
employment could become the new normal, along with income inequality and regional disparities. 
Social tensions – between city and country, fully and partly employed, ‘native’ and immigrant - 
could rise. Europe could become an ageing, economic colony of China and India. Our shared values 
– such as individual liberty, social solidarity and democratic openness – could be swept away in a 
tide of silicon and code. 
But equally, we can give ourselves a bright outlook, through wise use of policy levers. Education 
will be one vital tool: With so much change underway, demand for education – throughout one’s 
life – is likely to soar and re-skilling, “up-skilling” and other forms of flexible, mass vocational 
training will spread. Our universities and schools could (should) be delivering, not just degrees, but 
the basic tools a citizen needs for a new labour market of semi-autonomous employment – and, 
given the importance Europeans place on individual empowerment, this could become a unique 
European advantage. Likewise, our research labs could be leading, rather than following, new 
technologies. And our entrepreneurs and innovators could be the owners, rather than customers, 
of vast new multinational technology companies. New actors will also change our prospects: 
Foundations, public-private partnerships, crowdsourcing and crowd-financing. 
In short, our destiny is in our own hands. The next two chapters present opposing views of our 
future: one positive, one negative. The difference will be in the policy decisions we take today.
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3. A European success
        What happens if things go right in 2050? A positive outlook
The scenario, in brief
It’s 2050, and through a combination of good luck and good policy, several things have 
gone right. Europe and its knowledge economy are competitive in global markets; social 
tensions have diminished as the benefits of innovation-driven growth (technological and 
social) get spread more evenly; and the knowledge triangle is alive and well.
Since 2015, there has been a change in the political climate. In the face of rising 
international competition, public funding shortfalls and disruptive technologies, most 
people support European cooperation: Better to hang together, than hang separately. This 
means more EU-wide collaboration on taxing multinationals, coordinating research and 
regional development, and educating citizens.  Public finances remain under pressure, 
but better coordination of regulation and incentives has mobilised more private capital 
than ever before to help fund research, education and innovation. The knowledge triangle 
benefits from, and contributes to, sustainable European growth.
At the core of Europe’s knowledge economy are clusters of well-funded, internationally 
renowned universities in some of Europe’s important cities, in strong partnerships with 
regional institutions. The growing demand for continual education and re-training has 
prompted new efficiencies: course modules shared within university clusters, online and 
artificial intelligence-based teaching, specialisation within institutions, public and private. 
Innovation is often open; multinationals, SMEs, universities and other actors, including 
citizens, work together in fast-changing global networks to solve global problems. Research 
is, more than ever, a European forte: Frontier science is a competitive, EU-wide affair 
led by an enlarged European Research Council, while regional disparities in innovation 
capacities are countered through separately administered regional development funds.  
In short, things are looking up. Where Europe once produced 30% of the world’s ideas, it 
has more than held its own as Asia rose; it is moving towards 40%. Many of its industries 
are competitive, building on healthy SMEs. Its universities are strong, its citizens fulfilled 
– and its core values, such as equality, openness, social inclusion and environmental 
responsibility, are upheld. 
***
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Is this scenario too optimistic? In the beginning of the millennium it would have seemed more like 
a business-as-usual scenario. Now it feels that a lot has to go right for us to hit 2050 with such 
brilliant prospects. But achieving that, we believe, is within the means of the European Union. 
In part, it requires solving some fundamental problems unrelated to the knowledge triangle: ‘a 
better Europe’, multinational taxation, a single market, for example. Solutions are available, and 
we assume that the inevitable round of crises, economic or otherwise, will provide periodic spurs 
to our leaders to adopt these answers. Already, we see how the 2008 crisis has prompted a degree 
of international coordination among central bankers, finance ministers and financial regulators 
that had not been thought possible before. 
But fulfilling these promises also requires a strong knowledge system in Europe. Many futurologists 
agree: faced with rising competition from China, India and the rest of the world, Europe’s strength 
must come from the culture, skills, creativity and knowledge of its people. If those are ensured, the 
knowledge triangle of education, innovation and research will power us towards greater prosperity 
and better lives. So a healthy knowledge triangle isn’t just the product of lucky circumstances; it 
helps create those circumstances.
What follows is our view of what this favourable scenario could look like. 
The policy framework: United Europe, strong regions 
Looking back from 2050, what economic and political conditions were essential to prosperity? We 
see a stable and functioning European Union as an important component. It is not so much that 
a particular form of European governance is required; on that we take no position. But for purely 
pragmatic and economic reasons, we believe there must be some form of governance that will 
enable coordination at European level.  Our economic and social problems are more easily solved 
by working together than apart; and the alternative, a dynamic spiral of European disintegration, 
will have dramatic negative consequences. 
Start with two megatrends: accelerating technological change and globalisation. Since the 1990s 
we saw them rapidly reducing the importance of physical borders for commerce, innovation and 
many other aspects of our lives; by 2050, within Europe, only cultural borders remain. From the 
2010s, when multinational tax evasion first surfaced as a hot issue, EU member-states found 
The global picture
A positive global context is not a necessary condition for a better Europe, but it would surely help. The EU’s 
AUGUR Project (http://www.augurproject.eu/), which made forecasts for 2030, estimated that global GDP would 
grow about 0.4% faster from 2010 to 2030 if there was strong regional collaboration on good governance, and 
0.9% if there was strong, multipolar global governance. 
Another study, by the UK Ministry of Defence, projected: 
“The pressures of globalization are likely to mean that individual countries will find it increasingly difficult to 
act unilaterally – most countries are likely to be less powerful. This could lead to a reduction in conflict. The 
state is still likely to have the most important voice in international affairs, but out to 2045 the private sector 
and non-state organisations are likely to become more influential. There is likely to be an increase in the use of 
private security companies by governments – interdependencies may strengthen, despite their largely separate 
motivations.” (“Strategic Trends Programme: Global Strategic Trends – Out to 2045,” 5th edition 2014)
33
it easier to tackle the Amazons and Googles of the world together – and now, increasingly, in 
collaboration with US and other non-EU governments whose tax bases were being eroded by 
corporate tax dodgers. The switch in VAT rules, to tax in the online customer’s home rather than 
in the supplier’s, was a step in that direction. At the same time, the member-states have been 
cooperating more on regulation and incentives for multinationals: How to induce the investments 
and socially constructive behaviour that are needed.  The addition of most professional services 
to the Single Market helped, as did cooperation on an Energy Union. The bottom line:  government 
treasuries, while still under pressure, have more room to manoeuvre. 
Treasuries would need that flexibility for the many challenges they face. One is staying ahead 
of the curve on technology: funding basic research and stimulating innovation in personalised 
medicine, artificial intelligence, advanced manufacturing and other vital fields. European 
companies, and the economy overall, needs 
to control these technologies rather than 
be victimised by them. Another challenge is 
regional development: It was quickly seen that 
what used to be called a digital divide cannot 
extend to these newer technologies without 
serious negative consequences. Economic 
growth and social cohesion is better for all 
if all regions in Europe have a role to play. 
Complex, well-informed strategies (‘Smart 
specialisation’ or ‘eco-smart’ or…) are now the 
norm at the regional level.  Regions have the 
capabilities to target their best prospects in a 
global economy supported by data-intensive 
techniques to monitor progress and adjust 
policy regularly. 
At the same time, the long-running trend of urbanisation has made regional policy ever more 
important. Take London: 350 years ago, it comprised 10% of the UK population. Just before World 
War II, it was nearly 20%. A century later, it is still growing as the opportunities and infrastructure 
of a megalopolis draw more and more citizens. Such cities are powerful hubs of education, 
research and innovation – and of sustainability. In 2013 London was home to four of the top 
40 universities in the world1. European policy has made ‘’smart eco-cities’’ a research priority, 
making local companies global leaders in the new energy and environmental technologies the 
world is seeking. Consequently, regions have gained more powers devolving from nation-states, 
over education, research and innovation policy.  Knowledge triangle institutions have shifted their 
attention to, and increased their interactions with, regional authorities as new loci of regulation 
and power.
This paradoxical situation – strong regional authorities, embedded in a strong European and global 
framework – is a source of stability, a new manifestation of the old benefits of European diversity. 
It promotes citizen involvement in policy, empowerment, creativity, culture.  Education has become 
a near-continuous activity, so people can adapt to change faster and lead more-fulfilled lives. An 
educated population also means more support for research, education and innovation. 
1 See http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/world-university-rankings/2014-15/world-ranking
What if…
A special challenge for Europe in 2050 will be 
ensuring a fair distribution of new technologies 
across the region. 
Economists have already measured the retarding 
effect of inadequate bandwidth in regions, poor 
IT support in industry, and outdated hospitals. As 
technological change accelerates, the potential 
for inequity rises – and this, we believe, will be 
another factor pushing EU member-states towards 
supporting more coordination for development. 
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The research angle: Strong labs, citizen science
Automation and data-intensive science have changed the nature and economics of doing 
research. Whereas in the past science was a matter of gathering specific data to test hypotheses, 
now the vast stores of data accessible over networks around the world make research a more 
dynamic process: data mining can suggest hypotheses, citizen- scientists contribute in new 
and unpredictable ways, and scientific conclusions are expressed in often-changing degrees of 
confidence. All this takes expertise, of course – making academic specialists, and the universities 
at which they work, vital. It also takes capital, 
for computer networks, data repositories, 
archives and more. So those are forces for 
concentration. 
On the other hand, all kinds of new actors 
are rushing into the research game. Millions 
of citizens, benefitting from the continual 
university contacts that ubiquitous lifelong 
learning has created, are getting onto 
networks to add their own insights, data and 
hypotheses to science.  
This is especially true in astronomy, ecology 
and climate research (finally, people can do 
something about the weather, rather than just 
talk about it.) This isn’t merely open science; 
it’s radical open access. And it’s facilitated by 
Europe’s prestigious Research Infrastructure 
– CERN, the European Southern Observatory, 
online environmental monitoring institutes 
– opening their networks to students, 
amateurs and companies; it’s the only way 
they could justify their continued public funding. This is not without risks. With synthetic biology 
now mainstream, for instance, the potential for bio-hacking is terrifying; much government R&D 
investment now goes into security systems that protect without constraining liberties. But overall, 
new research frontiers are spurring all kinds of new institutions, virtual and physical – some 
financed privately, some publicly, some by charities, and some by crowdfunding. People are voting 
for science with their own money – building public support for research across the EU.
A key part of this balancing act, between centralised and distributed research, is in a new, stronger 
definition of ‘public good’ that has emerged in the past half-century. Fundamental research is for 
the benefit of all citizens; from cosmology to quantum physics, it’s widely recognized that the 
private sector won’t pay enough and the public – whether through national treasuries, charities or 
crowd-funding – must2. Here, the European Research Council has evolved as a vital force, ensuring 
continent-wide competition for the smartest minds and strongest results. Indeed, it has become 
the “European Research Area” for fundamental research, a hub for national research councils with 
matching governance structures. Its own ruling Council has been broadened beyond scientists to 
include government, business and citizen members in response to pressure to address societal 
2 As mentioned earlier, companies support fundamental research indirectly, through taxation. Collaboration among tax authorities makes it 
much harder for multinationals to shop for favourable tax climes.
The new science
Something fundamental is changing in the way 
science happens – though exactly what and how is 
still uncertain. In a public consultation in 2014, the 
European Commission called it Science 2.0, and now 
refers to as Open Science:
“(Open Science) defines systemic changes that 
are currently taking place in the way the science 
and research system functions. It is characterised 
by an open, collaborative networked way of doing 
research, that has been referred to as Facebook for 
scientists. While the feedstock is big data, it requires 
many people to make inputs. 
(Open Science) is enabled by digital technologies 
and driven by the globalisation and growth of 
the scientific community, providing the means to 
address the Grand Challenges of our times.  (Open 
science) has impacts on the entire research cycle, 
from the inception of research to its publication, and 
on the way this cycle is organised. It also affects the 
evaluation of the quality and impact of research.”  
35
challenges. Its funding, and that of the national 
councils, focuses on societal challenges, as citizens 
get more engaged in research policy.  
EU investments - through coordinated but separate 
ERC and regional funding - aim to develop an 
ecosystem of urban or regional innovation hubs 
across Europe, north to south, east to west. At 
the same time, new forms of public-private 
partnerships in research are blurring the lines 
between Research and Innovation. 
 
Thus, the old debate over the right level of R&D 
investment – 3% of GDP or more? – has become 
irrelevant. There’s more of it everywhere, but the 
“it” is harder for an economist to define. The bottom 
line is that Europe’s open institutions, educated 
population and world-famous labs and universities 
maintain its position as a global powerhouse in 
knowledge, however you measure it.
The innovation angle: fast-changing ecosystems, new opportunities
By 2050, open innovation has become the dominant mode. Both large and small companies 
cannot afford to rely entirely on their own R&D; with so much capital involved – for networks, data 
analysis, research infrastructure and background knowledge – high-impact product and service 
development, the kind that creates winners in global markets, is prohibitively expensive for all but 
the very biggest conglomerates to handle on their own. Instead, companies extensively encourage, 
explore and use external, or exchange internal, ideas to advance their technology. In contrast to 
the rigid supply chains of multinationals at the start of the century, by 2050 companies are 
operating in ‘innovation ecosystems.’ Suppliers, academics, government programmes, individual 
consumers – all contribute to fast-changing networks for innovation, thrown up and taken down 
rapidly to suit changing market needs; all this is enabled by global networking and artificial 
intelligence. As a result of these innovation alliances, collaborative undergraduate, postgraduate 
and doctoral study programmes with placements, joint training and supervision, have become 
important recruitment routes allowing small companies to grow and expand.   The European 
Institute of Innovation and Technology and initiatives like it have become successful incubators of 
effective knowledge triangles, although they have evolved substantially. Dynamic ecosystems can 
be brutal for incumbents; and adaptation is the name of the game even for policy programmes. 
Into these dynamic ecosystems comes a bewildering variety of innovators, many of them new 
players. Some ideas are crowd-sourced, from individuals anywhere in the world; and some of 
the funding also comes from the crowd.  Some innovators, especially in healthcare and the 
environment, are backed by charitable foundations. Vanishing borders opened new opportunities 
for firms, universities and labs, leading to further strategic differentiation. The knowledge triangle 
of research, innovation and higher education has become a terrain of great institutional variety, 
where some institutions, mostly universities, are active on all sides of the triangle, while innovation 
and companies are increasingly present in higher education. At the same time, public financial 
incentives have succeeded in bringing small entrepreneurs together with higher education 
What if…
This scenario implies a proliferation of 
purpose-driven research funding agencies at 
all levels of government from local to global. 
Perhaps, a Global Climate Council, a European 
Agency for Social Research, a Munich Institute 
for Machine Learning – and so it goes. 
How many? In which fields? Will they exist in 
all countries? 
Another scenario could be the proliferation of 
missions inside existing national institutions, 
and a change in the character of research 
councils to include greater international 
collaboration and more focused missions. 
Which way? We can see pressures for 
specialisation and targeted missions, but the 
politics of it are unpredictable.
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and research institutions; they often focus 
on projects important to the economic and 
social well-being of their cities. This reflects 
the growing importance of Europe’s booming 
cities, and a sense of community involvement. 
It also yields hot products and services that, on 
the global market, enrich these communities 
and strengthen Europe’s position in the global 
economy; a ‘Paris original’ – or Warsaw or 
Athens – has taken on a whole new meaning 
in the international marketplace, as powerful 
brands in their own right. 
For the individual, the outcome is both 
exhilarating and frightening. The new 
technologies, themselves, have opened new 
possibilities. Lives are much longer and 
healthier. Manual tasks at home and at work 
are easier (except for back-to-naturists who 
resist the trend). Cities are stronger and 
comfortable and healthy places to live (“eco-
smart”). Countless work opportunities, for part-
time or temporary projects, can be found online 
or in the mega-cities. But gone is the idea of a 
job for life; and even full-time employee status 
is rare. It’s the ‘do-it-yourself’ economy.  
This has made social support, for people in 
transition from one task to another, essential – and no longer a social stigma to receive. This kind 
of support was, in accordance with European social history from Bismarck onwards, pioneered 
in Europe; it draws on the continent’s special values of social solidarity and égalité. But it is 
reinforced by new demographic trends. People have been forced to think about ways to mobilise 
and better use existing and neglected resources – and that includes the knowledge and skills of 
the ageing population, of immigrants and other formerly marginalised parts of society. Education 
supported by ICT is enabling new social movements – for sustainable food production, inclusion 
of all social group, privacy and security of data, and more. Overall, individuals have greater power 
than ever before to improve their own communities and environment. This new altruism has 
political impact, as well: For starters, it has led to an expectation that companies – especially large 
ones – engage in more socially constructive behaviour than in the past.
This also translates into more and more public entrepreneurship, for example social innovation 
or participation in crowd-funding schemes. The latter can socialise both risks and benefits of 
entrepreneurial ventures within particular communities. Indeed, the complex inter-relations of 
innovators - public and private, collective and individual - have created a feedback loop between 
technological change and policy development. Policy is constantly adjusting, calibrating, correcting 
as technology and other forces change society. The EU institutions, with their bird’s-eye view of 
trends, are especially important in spurring and helping shape these policies in the member-states 
and regions.
What if… 
Who will own all these new ideas in 2050? It 
depends.
Economics will force companies towards more 
open innovation. But there could be many different 
shades of ‘open.’ As we see already in, for instance, 
the flexible intellectual property framework of the 
European Institute of Innovation and Technology, 
the specific rules can vary by project and group. 
Also, the strength and length of IP protection could 
vary by sector or product category; for some, 20 
years, for others, three years. IP protection could be 
tuned to the technology and circumstances, rather 
than one-size-fits-all.
One consequence would be stronger partnerships 
between universities and companies for specific 
tasks; you trust your friends not to double-cross 
you. More corporate support for universities could 
come from consulting or joint ventures, meaning the 
universities will care less about individual patents, 
and today’s IP conflicts between corporate and 
university lawyers could diminish.
Of course, whatever happens, we will still have 
lawyers. IP litigation, between rival innovation eco-
systems if not within them, is bound to be a growth 
profession throughout this century.
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The education angle: Always learning, on-line and off
Education is “in.” Never before have so many wanted so much from teachers.  And never 
before have so many been empowered to become teachers. Longer, healthier lives permit more 
career changes; education needed. Globalisation and shifting innovation networks permit new 
opportunities for those with skills; education needed. New technologies require constant re-
training; education needed. Lifelong learning is no longer a term for policy wonks only; in 2050, 
it’s reality for empowered citizens who shift in and out of education in teacher and student roles. 
Studying involves a large amount of online learning. The massive online courses pioneered in the 
2010s have been improved, and are now standard, specialised parts of the teaching portfolio. 
Indeed, new artificial intelligence technologies go a step further, using expert systems and learning 
‘chips’ to speed the learning process for key skills. The learning-game market is huge. The very 
idea that billions were once spent on making games with flying birds or cartoon warriors is quaint; 
the real money is in educational games, and the EU has made development of the indigenous 
game industry a priority of industrial policy. All these technologies are adjuncts, rather than 
replacements, for human teachers. With this variety of methods available, education is increasingly 
self-directed. Overall, this expansion of education has created unheard-of opportunities for people 
to learn, change, and grow. 
Private companies supplement the educational offering with specialised vocational training 
– some for their own job recruits, and some as a profit centre. European private and public 
universities compete for students globally. The increased competition has not resulted in a crisis in 
the European university sector; the growing demand has simply enlarged the market for all. At the 
same time, a strong policy division has developed between the “public good” aspects of education, 
and private benefit. Having an educated electorate is a public good; public funding, from a range 
of sources European and local, is tight but still manages to support 13 years, from Kindergarten 
to Bachelor. Some PhD programmes are also publicly supported. But most education beyond the 
tertiary level has a big element of private funding – by companies who want trained employees, 
or by the students who want new horizons. Private gain, private expense, is the rule.
Europe’s top 50 universities combine international reach in education and research with strong 
partners in key multinationals.  These ‘’world class’’ institutions have concentrated their institutional 
strategies on being globally competitive, retaining and attracting top researchers and students 
worldwide, and attracting funding from sources beyond their city or country. They enjoy extensive 
financial and organisational autonomy from national states. They work in dynamic clusters 
with other universities which are increasingly specialised rather than trying to do everything for 
everybody. Funding constraints, while manageable, force all the institutions to focus on efficiency: 
Within their clusters, they co-develop teaching modules and tools, and they swap students (often 
online) to maximise efficiency. If the Technical University of Darmstadt has the best courses on 
geothermal energy, that’s where the students go – virtually, at least (and translation technologies 
have broken down most language barriers for online education.) It’s a good time for education; 
but the emphasis is on outcomes, rather than process. At the end of the day, people expect jobs 
and opportunities from what they learn, and employers demand it even more.  The old “CE” mark 
has found a new market.
In short, in 2050 Europe remains a great place to study, offering world-class higher education in 
all member states, accessible to all irrespective of their financial situation. 
* * *
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In this scenario, the knowledge 
triangle is thriving – and 
with it, European society. 
The potentially destabilising 
trends of globalisation, 
technology and demography 
have been turned to our 
advantage, in part through 
wise policy, and in part 
through the natural strengths 
of Europe: Its diversity, its 
values and the vast resources 
of its people. Many European 
universities are recognised as 
world leading; they all work in 
clusters, and offer unprecedented ways and opportunities to learn and grow. Its research is radically 
open to citizens and companies to join in, even when it takes place in centres of excellence.  Its 
innovators benefit from close links to research and education centres, providing the tools to excel 
in global markets. And a clear structure for the articulation between public and private good has 
emerged in education, as in research; economists, and taxpayers, are pleased with the balance. 
Above all, this is a scenario that sees an “intelligent Europe” as an essential element in a 
prosperous knowledge triangle: for economies of scale, efficiency, and social impact. Given today’s 
political climate, we don’t imagine this conclusion will come quickly or easily; there will be crises 
to precipitate it. Assuming we survive them, the outcome will be a stronger knowledge economy.
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4. Europe misses out
What if we make the wrong choices? A dystopian view of 2050
The scenario, in brief
It is 2050, and Europe’s capacity to innovate, educate and research is in decline. The 
cause: an inability, during the first half of the century, to be a leader rather than a victim 
of globalisation, technology and demographic megatrends.  Two generations of inaction, 
bad luck and bad decisions have taken their toll. Europe’s population is now less than 
10% of the world’s total 9 billion and its share of the world’s GDP is 15%.
Politically, Europe has fragmented into a coalition of rich and poor regions with minimal 
coordination. A Northern Arc has maintained free movement of goods, services, and 
people; other parts of Europe are fragmented. Multinational companies, and wealthy 
individuals, use global markets and digital technologies to avoid tax. Public treasuries are 
impoverished; and universities and labs depend heavily on private funding – new ideas 
and talent are controlled by the wealthy and powerful. 
A few great universities dominate; many weaker, regional universities have closed or 
merged. A few European companies are rich and smart enough to stay global champions, 
mainly by being able to dominate new global value chains in healthcare, transport and 
engineering; but generally Europe’s economic base has hollowed out, and the few innovators 
its universities produce quickly move to Beijing, Sao Paolo, Lagos, Singapore or Boston. 
Automation has moved beyond physical tasks to knowledge creation and exploitation; 
and with other regions of the world leading and controlling those technologies, millions 
of Europeans find themselves underemployed and in difficulty making ends meet. For the 
dominant multinational companies, Europe is now ‘outsourcee’, rather than outsourcer; 
most European companies have not grasped the new global economy. 
Where once Europe produced 30% of all new ideas in the world, it now struggles to yield 
even half that. It looks inward, fears the future, and sees its values – such as individual 
freedom, equality, openness, social security – gradually discredited. 
* * *
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What are the conditions under which Europe could miss 
out on the future? As the dystopian scenario above 
suggests, they aren’t that hard to imagine. 
That globalisation, technological acceleration, and 
demographic change are happening is indisputable; 
how we deal with them is what matters for our future. 
This chapter tries to paint one probable, unfavourable 
outcome for Europe, in which its basic values are swept 
aside by trends it does not, cannot or will not control. For 
the sake of clarity, we start with the possible political 
framework and then explore its ramifications for the 
education, innovation and research activities of Europe. 
But in fact it would not be a simple cause-and-effect 
process; declines in Europe’s innovative capacity would 
also spur political turmoil, rather than simply follow on 
from it. 
We are certainly not predicting this as Europe’s likely 
future. But like all dystopias, from Brave New World 
to Fahrenheit 451, this scenario is based on close 
observation of real world facts and trends around us – 
and is offered as a cautionary tale to urge action. 
The political framework: fragmentation rules the day
Our story begins with a technology trend: By 2050 automation has moved beyond the factory 
to nearly every aspect of our lives, focused on artificial cognition, ubiquitous sensing, big data 
analytics and machine learning. Service bots, flexible robots, handle goods and material1.  Fruit 
and vegetable picking, as well as processing and delivering food, is fully automated; the notion 
of a ‘family farm’ or le terroir are quaint artefacts of history. Maintaining offices, hospitals and 
schools is taken over by robots; transport is fully automated. Most information-intensive tasks 
have been automated. Pattern recognition and intelligent machines supplant many former office 
jobs. New creative jobs are constantly evolving from new technologies – but only for the skilled 
few.  The labour market shrinks, and high levels of structural unemployment become normal.  In 
this environment the trend towards greater inequality continues to build as returns to capital 
accelerate. Employment in service-related industries has not been able to keep up with the 
number of jobs lost to machines. Many people, whether white or blue collar, are out of work or 
under-employed; and part-time, distributed jobs – in a global, digitally managed job bazaar – 
become the norm. 
A growing portion of these people are living in cities; these are dynamic hubs for commerce, 
innovation – and discontent. In the countryside, agriculture has intensified to avoid imports and 
to maintain self-sufficiency. Especially in Eastern Europe, many nature reserves and farmland 
areas with high natural value are lost. The lack of innovation capacity in Europe makes things 
worse because no new technologies are developed to decouple intensification of agriculture and 
1 http://www.ifr.org/industrial-robots/statistics/
What if…
The essence of this scenario is that 
automation triggers unemployment, 
social exclusion, discontent, and a 
disintegration of governance. We could 
pick other trends as possible bad-news 
triggers – but, as described in the 
accompanying utopian scenario, every 
megatrend can as well be a source 
of strength as weakness. Advanced 
automation, if mastered in Europe, could 
provide citizens with new freedoms, new 
jobs, and new opportunities in the global 
economy.  
There are some encouraging signs of 
this: Many EU member-states, as well 
as the EU’s Horizon 2020 programme, 
are devoting new resources towards 
developing automation and advanced 
manufacturing technologies, and 
Europe’s engineering industry remains 
a strong, global player absorbing new 
ideas. 
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environmental strain. On the other hand the reduced per capita income also results in reduced 
municipal waste and CO2 emissions.
Estimated worldwide annual shipments of industrial robots. 
Source: 
World 
Robotics 2014
Under these difficult economic and social circumstances, nationalist and anti-European movements 
- reactions to the feeling that borders no longer protect the community - become dominant. 
European coordination struggles for democratic legitimacy, as the costs of ‘Europe’ are seen as 
unjustifiable. Limited resources and conflict over their distribution fuels national egoisms. Every 
nation – and, increasingly, every region - seeks a ‘’fair return’’ on its investments in each and 
every one of the European or international agreements it has entered. The governance landscape 
has become extremely complicated since 2020, when nations and regions started to opt in or 
out of treaties and organisations. European policies are fragmented and captured by different 
stakeholders – particularly, those with the financial and knowledge capital to exercise power2.
  
Thus, European diversity, a source of past strength, gives way to fragmentation: a source of 
weakness. The use of domestic policies to compete directly with European neighbours becomes 
widespread, and includes “competitive” fiscal frameworks and devaluations, and regulatory and 
practical constraints to mobility of people and goods. Regional disparities across Europe widen; 
increasingly, where you are born determines how well you will live and work. A few countries may 
benefit, but the EU overall struggles. Multinational corporations play off national and regional 
governments against one another.  As information becomes the biggest part of added value, 
the location of «production» becomes very difficult to identify and companies can optimise 
«production» in states with low taxes. As a result, national governments become poorer and less 
able to offer social protections. This fuels social tensions and conflict. Of course, new forms of 
cooperation between the public and the private sectors have emerged to deal with the problems, 
including extensive use of surveillance technologies and predictive technologies based on data 
analytics.  But civil liberties suffer as a result. 
2 Project Augur calculated that a break –up of the Eurozone is likely to cost about 16% GDP points in 2030 (starting with a 5% drop the year 
after the break-up). See http://www.augurproject.eu/IMG/pdf/Executive_summary_final.pdf
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Lack of trust in the EU: Percentage of nationals who say they tended not to trust the EU, as an institution. 
 
Source: EU, Eurobarometer
The bottom line: The role of joint European action in shaping global rules and governance 
diminishes. Gradually, power in the global economy continues to shift towards the more-dynamic 
East and South. And a few global players control the flow of data and material, as well as the 
processes within globally organised value chains. 
The innovation angle: Multinational control, an SME deficit
In the early 19th century, British economist David Ricardo developed a theory of ‘comparative 
advantage’, in which each trading nation specialises in what it does best and all benefit. In our 
dystopian scenario, this specialisation has gone farther than anyone could have imagined: Not 
just nations, but regions, companies, and individuals struggle to find their place in global markets 
managed by digital communications. It doesn’t matter anymore where an innovation occurs; 
mammoth corporations can stitch together their own far-ranging networks of suppliers and 
customers, to suit their own interests. Ideas are co-developed across borders. Supply chains are 
built and disassembled at will, and business relationships are more often temporary and narrowly 
targeted than in the past. Manufacturing is all 3-D printing; components are made wherever they’re 
best and cheapest, and assembled wherever it’s most efficient. Capital flows across borders, with 
minimal government restraint or knowledge. The global economy has become amazingly efficient 
at innovating services, products and methods. The borders to commerce have all but vanished. Of 
course, there are frequent financial crises, as the interconnectedness and complexity of the global 
economy have risen; but people are resigned to it. 
For some – world-class artists and professionals, low-cost suppliers, engineering powerhouses or 
mega-banks – this is all good news. An expert, in whatever field or country, commands top pay and 
privileges. Lucky investors in the dominant companies enjoy fat dividends (and expert accountants 
help them skip the tax; this is at least one European specialty in the global economy.) But a key 
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difference between winners and losers in this world is the value 
of their knowledge ‘assets’; how much of the new technologies 
and ideas can they master and control? The old battles over 
intellectual property rights continue: The global Internet has 
long favoured winner-takes-all strategies (who wants to buy 
the second-best app?) but at the same time it has enabled 
community ownership of ideas.  A bewildering range of IPR 
models has resulted, specialised to different industries and 
needs and varying from a collaborative commons to corporate 
concentration. But the general trend favours consolidation in 
sectors where multinationals operate. This all puts Europe at 
a disadvantage: it is generating a smaller share of the world’s 
ideas than in the past, and its influence on global standards – 
a vital aspect of international trade – has diminished.  
The consequences are severe for smaller companies, which find it difficult to keep up with the 
rate of change - especially as the big companies find they have to move R&D to the hottest 
innovation clusters outside Europe to remain competitive.  The diminishing local access to top 
technologies worsens the long-standing European deficit in entrepreneurship3. Legal systems that 
punish failure too hard, rigid labour markets, and business cultures and corporate structures that 
make EU firms slower to react to technological opportunities combine with a lack of commitment 
of public investment to strong, high quality basic science.  This leads to a failure to tap into new 
sources of growth. The trend has been described by a 2014 World Economic Forum paper:
 
«The EU is increasingly falling behind globally in building the digital infrastructure and innovative 
capacity that would allow its economies to unlock new sources of growth4». 
Of course, the pain is not evenly spread across Europe. Some states invest heavily in high quality 
basic science and have strong entrepreneurial cultures and traditions. Yet, even they find it difficult 
to sustain their economic and innovation performance as markets around them decline. 
3 http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_354_en.pdf
4 The Europe 2020 Competitiveness Report: Building a More Competitive Europe http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Europe2020_Com-
petitivenessReport_2014.pdf
What if… 
Leading companies are able 
to combine open innovation, 
open data, open access and 
competitive open innovation 
platforms with protection of their 
intellectual property rights.   
Would Europe be the base of 
such companies? Or, would 
European companies struggle 
to use such platforms because 
of lack of infrastructure and 
established IPR positions? 
Will EU businesses stay in the global R&D charts?
In 2013, Europe was the base of 633 of the world’s top 2,500 R&D investing companies.  German automotive 
manufacturers and Swiss chemical and pharmaceutical companies figure amongst the world’s top 10, together 
with ICT companies from the US and South Korea. But over the last 10 years this list has witnessed the rise of 
East Asia.  Taiwan’s electronics industries are most noteworthy, but so too is industry in China and South Korea. 
 
How will European companies fare in these statistics in 2050? In this scenario the position of existing 
companies is eroded and there are few, if any new European entrants in the lists of the world’s highest R&D 
spenders.
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Would you prefer to be self-employed? 
Source: Eurobarometer survey 2012 (%) 
The research angle: Poorer, weaker, fragmented
The research side of Europe’s knowledge triangle will also be strongly affected by evolving 
economic and political conditions. These are brought about by high unemployment across all 
EU regions, conflicts in East and South East borders, separatist terrorism, and increasing 
refugees.  Researchers’ mobility has decreased and collaboration across borders is more difficult. 
International scientific infrastructures face challenges of legitimacy; and the drive for economies 
of scale in European research is lost.  Yet, the biggest challenge is the funding shortfall for public 
research in a number of countries. Many research institutions, especially from smaller and weaker 
economies, find it increasingly difficult to produce knowledge that is relevant and important in 
the global economy, and become less and less competitive.  In the wealthier and more advanced 
European economies the budget gaps are smaller, but even there the competitiveness of top 
institutions against faster-growing US, Chinese and other competitors is eroded. 
The move towards open science becomes a double-edged sword for Europe.  On one hand, it 
makes research more efficient and global collaboration the norm – essential for such fields as 
climate change and biodiversity. It also brings opportunities for everyone to pursue their curiosities. 
Sensors, open research infrastructures and virtually free computer power enable many citizens to 
be part of the knowledge generation process; and thus research ceases to be only for specialists. 
Indeed, public engagement in research is redefining the concept of literacy. 
But on the other hand, open science is a huge challenge for research funders and research 
institutions, as it undermines their former, professional prerogatives; the definition of ‘scientist’ 
has changed more in the past half-century than at any time since its coinage in the early 19th 
century.  Important scientific disciplines have become part of popular culture, whilst new emerging 
disciplines find it difficult to institutionalise; the definition of ‘state of the art’ research keeps 
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changing, faster and faster, as the pace of science accelerates. Indeed, knowledge production 
in many fields is already fully automated through big data collection and artificial intelligence. 
This requires capital, and so research data and infrastructures are controlled by a few powerful 
organisations.
Of course, there are parts of science that are not open because of the importance of confidentiality 
and technological advantage – for example, for military or high-value industrial research. These 
fields are also highly automated, but data and infrastructures are strongly protected. Top talent is 
prized; the most valuable researchers are tracked by global expert consultancies and often hired 
by global investors, expanding the notion of ’consultancy without borders.’ Top institutions are 
also prized. These include government labs and universities; universities, in particular, can work 
under the secrecy and IP conditions imposed by industrial firms. But these winning universities will 
be few. Public funding has dried up in Europe’s weaker countries, undercutting their universities 
and their ability to produce employable graduates. In rich and poor countries alike, researchers 
depend heavily on private funding. Multinationals collaborate with national research councils and 
institutions, imposing their own research agendas and policy priorities. They get early access 
to ground-breaking research, and steer public funding 
towards helping them commercialise it; that’s what makes 
jobs and growth, they argue.
The result: public funding for frontier research has shrunk. 
The European Research Council is a shell of its former 
self. Europe’s technological innovation is increasingly 
dependent on Asian science. The Americans, themselves 
embattled in global markets as never before, have thrown 
up barriers to EU-US collaboration; talk of trans-Atlantic 
trade deals is long past. The European science system 
has lost its position in an increasingly Asian-centric world; 
whereas once Europe produced a third of all scientific 
publications, it now accounts for barely a sixth. 
What if…
As public engagement in science 
increases, the risk of anti-science 
cultural movements also increases.  
Creationists, climate deniers, and 
other fringe groups can gather 
strength from social media, exploiting 
scientific mistakes or failures or 
public panic over extreme events. Can 
the scientific establishment find an 
answer to such challenges? What if 
it can’t? 
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As a result of political fragmentation, Europe’s role in addressing global challenges has weakened, 
while disparities in scientific and technological capacities across Europe have widened. Europe has 
some global centres of excellence – in climate change, bio and medical research, social sciences 
and humanities – but they are losing ground as their public funding shrinks. ‘’Brain drain’’ to other 
global centres, in other continents, has accelerated since 2020; and within Europe, lack of support 
for trans-European knowledge networks impedes mobility of ideas and researchers.  
The education angle: Winner takes all
The good news for education: Demand has never been higher. Besides conventional secondary 
and tertiary education, a vast range of continuing education, specialised certificates and re-
skilling is on offer – and eagerly sought by a population in need of new skills, new jobs and new 
opportunities as technology and globalisation accelerate. The bad news: with public budgets under 
pressure, Europe fragmented and the levers for research and innovation consolidating into a few 
wealthy hands, higher education in Europe is in crisis. The private sector has stepped in to fill some 
of the gaps, but not all; and private education is for those able to pay, not the general population. 
The Bologna system of progressive degrees is breaking down; people are learning more, but more 
often in informal, ad hoc settings – to learn a specific skill or get a job.
National budget constraints have hurt education funding and the number of higher education 
institutions has halved to around 2,000. As graduate unemployment rises, universities are finding it 
more difficult to pay teachers, at least for undergraduate courses (what private company wants to 
invest in a bunch of unskilled 18-year-olds?) Different universities have adopted different strategies 
to survive. The research component is emphasised by the top-ranked universities, as it allows 
them to form lucrative links with firms. Others emphasise individually tailored programmes and 
certificates, to attract students 
and funding. Some are focused 
on their local communities 
– a good strategy for the 
universities lucky enough to be 
sited in Europe’s fast-growing 
urban mega-cities. Others, 
with the best reputations and 
biggest treasuries, operate in 
a global market and compete 
for the smartest students and 
the most active corporate 
recruiters. That some are in 
Europe is historical coincidence, 
not the new economic or social 
reality.
Virtual reality is common for online, distance learning and testing. Online education including 
MOOCs, after an initially rocky start 35 years earlier, is now standard for all universities; the kinks 
have been ironed out, and these huge courses now dominate mass provision of skills and research 
knowledge. Effective on-line certification has made virtual training normal. Automation also brings 
corporate practice into education.  Companies are deeply involved in skills training, either for 
recruitment or as a profit centre in its own right.  Augmented cognition technologies, now starting 
to appear on the market, are popular with the multinationals: why waste money on a year-long 
What if….
Some member-states may resist the trends, and spend more on their 
national education systems rather than less – for cultural or political 
reasons. That’s certainly possible for Germany, the UK and some other 
wealthy countries with a history of strong university funding. 
But tough economic conditions will make such policies difficult to 
sustain, and will eventually lead to concentration in public university 
systems – especially in poorer countries.  We can imagine that by 2030 
concentration trends will be already apparent, and that by 2050 there 
could be fewer than 2,000 traditional universities across the EU – about 
half the number today. The private actors that replace them in training 
are unlikely to link it with research; those are separate businesses, 
outside a university. Graduate education will suffer as Europe’s research 
system concentrates and so will the competitiveness of large sections 
of Europe and the quality of life of its citizens.
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master’s programme when these clever technologies can force-feed the needed knowledge in 
a few months, without having to take time off from work? Large companies have developed 
their own instruments for recruiting, testing and training employees, and sell these new products 
to specialised consultancies and smaller companies. Lifelong learning in public institutions is a 
luxury reserved for those who can afford it.
In 2050 a few European countries have managed to maintain a small number of world class 
universities – the ones, again, whose research strengths, international reputation, and deep 
private pockets have made them winners. International rankings have proliferated; and they 
dominate funding and recruitment decisions. Below the top universities, a wide range of state or 
private institutions offer varied programmes and specialties, with a mostly local focus; many are 
linked in networks to the fewer, stronger universities, as both suppliers and customers to them. 
Learning outcomes for employment and entrepreneurship are the main goals for graduates, who 
are increasingly hunting globally to find employment. Large social groups become marginalised 
without the skills needed.
* * *
In this scenario, the knowledge triangle suffers from fragmentation and decline. The 19th 
century, Humboldt vision of a university combining research and teaching has faded; only the top 
universities can sustain it, while the rest scramble to get by as best they can in local markets. 
A comparatively few mega-multinationals are picking and choosing how they recruit employees 
and train them, and with whom and how they do R&D. Frontier research is withering for lack 
of public funding – meaning that, eventually, technological change will slow down; but that’s 
decades ahead. And, with Europe’s political cohesion long since destroyed, it’s every state, region 
and citizen for itself in a global market. The knowledge triangle is more of a knowledge Web or 
network, with the rich and powerful controlling the central nodes. European values are history.
Yes, this is a pretty depressing outlook. And yes, none of us know how these trends will really play 
out. But we need to look at a worst-case scenario of the future to see just how important the 
policy choices of today will be. 
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5. Making the right choices
What will 2050 be like? Faster, most likely.
Already, technological change is accelerating. In energy, the generations of succeeding technologies 
have shortened - from wood to coal to oil to nuclear to renewables; what next? In life sciences, we 
have moved from a theory of natural selection (1854), to a structural picture of DNA (1953), to 
reading the entire human genome (1998), to editing it (2015); what next? This isn’t just a matter 
of speed; with faster technological change comes a new dimension – a greater volume – of 
change throughout society. We see this today in information and communications technologies. 
In the span of one life we have moved from transistor to chip to Web to smartphone to cyber-
warfare – and with it our social and economic lives have moved into the kind of virtual dimensions 
that were once science fiction. What’s next? Big data is becoming a crucial resource for science, 
economy and society. Computational science may accelerate the growth of knowledge. Artificial 
intelligence may re-write its own code, based on feedback from global sensor networks.  The very 
nature of intelligence – human or machine – may change. 
Accelerating technological change is not a natural law. It is the product of important processes in 
human society; and mankind can, if it so wills, restrain it. Already, we see a backlash in parts of 
Europe against some technological ‘advances’ – particularly when they impinge upon long-held 
European values such as individual privacy. And there are many other major trends affecting us – 
some enabled by technology. Globalisation sweeps us ever-faster towards new economic systems, 
cultural contexts, and opportunities for personal fulfilment – or abnegation, depending on how 
things evolve.  Demographic trends affect us all: the ageing EU population, the move to cities, the 
splintering of family units. Altogether these and other forces have profound implications: they 
affect the environment, climate, economies, jobs, health – our very definition of the rights and 
responsibilities of a civilisation. Knowledge production, absorption and use; research, education 
and innovation; all working together define our ability to manage the resulting opportunities and 
challenges. An “intelligent” Europe will be a richer, safer, healthier, happier Europe.
But will we be intelligent? Will we make the right policy choices? Will we make them quickly 
enough? As everything speeds up – technological change, demographic shifts, global interactions 
– entire industries can be created or destroyed in a few years, and fortunes gained or lost in a few 
exchange-trading seconds. Our policy responses must be faster than before, and wiser.
50
These are the issues we have tried to raise in the preceding chapters, painting two pictures of 
2050. Depending on the nature and timing of our policy choices, Europeans will be better educated, 
and more in demand in global job markets, than ever before; or, they will be unemployed. They 
will be leaders in new technologies, applying knowledge to improve the economy, preserve and 
improve the environment, and strengthen social bonds; or, they will be victims of technologies 
they cannot master. They will have well-financed, public knowledge institutions and clear policies 
distinguishing public good and private gain; or, they will be bankrupt. They will be intelligently 
governed, employing EU-level coordination when it makes sense (and not, when it doesn’t); or, 
they will be fractious.
Looking at what differentiates the two scenarios, we have identified three broad principles that 
guide our thinking about what Europe’s knowledge institutions and governance must do to prosper. 
They are, in themselves, opportunities to grasp or, to use a homely metaphor, trains not to be 
missed.
1. Openness.  An open system adapts better to change. It includes open access to science – but 
goes far beyond: open markets, open debate, open government. In short, openness in all the 
ways knowledge is created, transmitted and applied will empower European citizens.
2. Experimentation and flexibility. To adapt, one must experiment – to find what works and 
where it works, to discover new business models and technologies, to grasp new knowledge 
and market opportunities. That requires regional, local and individual autonomy, and support for 
experimentation, in our knowledge systems. 
3. European-level cooperation. Fragmentation can become chaos. Some form of supra-regional 
coordination and support for the knowledge system will be needed. This includes creating the 
framework conditions for a single European market in ideas and talent, supporting research 
infrastructure and fundamental science (a public good), and enabling open participation of 
citizens everywhere.  
In pursuing those opportunities, there are some important challenges to be overcome. Each of 
them risks propelling Europe towards the negative scenario, by setting off cycles of discontent and 
fragmentation.  We are thinking of:
1. Structural unemployment and greater inequality
2. Funding shortfalls and shrinking tax bases
3. Talent crises as universities suffer and the smart leave Europe.
The opportunities and challenges form the backdrop for our policy recommendations.
Principle 1. An open knowledge system in Europe 
The negative vision showed the rich and privileged, whether corporate or individual, controlling the 
future; the positive vision showed all citizens sharing in it. We want a future in which all citizens 
can join in the process of research, education and innovation – because they want a better job, a 
healthier body, a cleaner environment, a richer community or a happier, more fulfilled life. We want 
a future in which it’s easy for new players with new ideas to enter a market, and not get blocked 
by excessive regulation or protected monopolies; a future in which knowledge can circulate freely, 
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in classrooms, online, in markets, across borders. The reason: An open society adapts more easily 
to rapid change. Its members can sense opportunities and threats faster, experiment with possible 
responses more easily, and, gradually and noisily, change and adapt. We don’t know what 2050 
will be like – but we don’t have to know if we can adapt.
By openness, we mean something far beyond conventional talk of ‘open access’ in scientific 
publishing. We mean openness in every part of our knowledge system, from lab to classroom to 
marketplace. Of course, there is already a trend towards openness. It is enabled by ICT, accelerates 
knowledge production, and challenges institutions. Research institutions, because they value open 
science, become facilities managers for shared resources – often open internationally. Libraries find 
their role as spaces for reading becomes less important than their role in knowledge management 
and publishing. Universities compete with one another, globally. More large companies do their R&D 
in semi-open networks, in collaboration with universities, suppliers, customers and governments. 
These institutional transitions need encouragement; they can be threatening to incumbents. Policy 
makers must embrace openness, avoiding the temptation to “protect” established institutions 
(academic or corporate), ensuring a level playing-field, and providing appropriate investment in 
infrastructures across the European Union. 
To this end, we identify a few broad areas for action: supporting infrastructure, ensuring data 
access and literacy, reforming intellectual property rules, opening markets and programmes, and 
enabling citizen participation.
Investment in research infrastructures. It may seem odd to start a discussion of openness with 
brick and mortar institutions; but such are the realities of the knowledge system. As research 
costs rise, economies of scale force more sharing – of costly lab equipment, databases and 
knowledge. That, by definition, requires openness. CERN, with 12,000 participating researchers in 
21 countries, is an extreme example, but representative nonetheless. Europe has long understood 
that no individual country can cover all these needs, and created bodies – such as the European 
Strategy Forum on Research Infrastructures, or ESFRI – to help coordinate funding. This is a 
good start, but more is needed: more money, more installations, more collaboration. And these 
should not be limited to Europe: Initiatives like the Square Kilometre Array, the world’s largest 
radio telescope to be spread over Africa and Australia but managed from Europe, demonstrate 
the value of international partnership in infrastructure. As the US and China compete for world 
leadership in infrastructures, Europe cannot afford to stay out of the race, for, at a minimum it 
needs to be involved in the process of defining the rules of openness and sharing at a global scale. 
All this requires investment – more than we have, so far, been willing to accept.
Of particular importance here are systems for open science: the platforms used for research 
collaborations, communication of results, and archiving of data and publication. These systems, 
while essential scientific tools, also affect who gets credited with discoveries, and who can profit 
from them. In the international arena, for example, they exacerbate problems stemming from 
differences in IPR regimes - for example by offering advantages to those who are “first to file” or 
“first to invent”. Increasingly, we see them also spurring controversies over privacy and security. 
Solutions to these problems will be found, but should be guided by two principles. The first is 
that open access to data is important for progress in science and industry, and that it should 
be supported at every opportunity.  The second is that data literacy is essential to our society. 
Faced with a bombardment of data and data-based arguments, individuals need to be able to 
understand and critically evaluate information to function in society, in their jobs, and in the polity. 
The two ideas – train people to work with data, and make it open for them to work with – are basic. 
Data literacy would have another effect: encouraging greater citizen participation in science and 
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innovation. We already see ‘citizen-science’ at work in astronomy, ornithology, and many branches 
of the social sciences and humanities. Open science, as it expands with more standardised and 
user-friendly interfaces, will involve more and more citizens. It will spur more citizens’ support for 
scientific endeavours, not only with their votes but also their money (through crowd-funding or 
charities.) What’s needed now is a step change. 
We urge the creation of a European Knowledge Space – an online framework open to all citizens 
for research, analysis, debate and sharing, to function as a knowledge pool to underpin the search 
for solutions to societal challenges. It is not some specific pieces of ICT technology we have in mind 
– though it would certainly include those. Rather, this would be a living, evolving set of policies, 
incentives and tools making it easier, across the EU, for all to share and debate knowledge.  It 
would permit citizens to join in those searches, and have a say in which challenges matter most, 
through fora for policy debate linked to all relevant data and knowledge pools. It would be a 
strong force for social inclusion, across all EU regions and interest groups. It would permit policy 
makers to exchange information on new approaches and technology assessment methods. It 
would paint a big, integrated picture of European knowledge in various domains – for teaching, 
researching or innovating. It would be open to links beyond Europe. Some key elements of the idea 
exist already. Social media and other online tools permit far more sharing of knowledge than ever 
before imagined. Big Data tools are rapidly appearing to analyse this knowledge. EU initiatives, 
such as the Commission-sponsored Research Data Alliance to promote global cooperation in data 
sharing, are working to improve online collaboration within the research community. And the 
European Research Area is already promoting greater mobility of ideas and knowledge-workers 
across the EU. 
But we are urging something bigger – a broader way of thinking about how knowledge can move 
– building on open science and on the public demand for open access to research processes 
funded by public funds to address societal challenges. This effort would create the policies and 
infrastructure for all citizens to participate openly in research and innovation – to move out of the 
conventional policy silos and become a mainstream, job-creating objective for Europe. For research 
to solve societal challenges, the knowledge it produces must become part of the knowledge base 
used for policy decisions. The EU is mandated by the current Treaty for the European Union to 
finance research in order to support its policies as described in the Treaty. This can be Big Data for 
policy. It can be the explicit goal of EU Framework Programmes of the future. 
Openness also applies to markets. Officially, Europe’s old policies of ‘national champions’ have 
been discredited, and competition enforcement has greatly expanded; but in practice, many local 
barriers to new entrants remain – especially in the knowledge system. Academic appointments 
are often politicised; transferring professional credentials from one country to another remain 
difficult; disruptive new products or services can be easily barred (viz., the controversial Uber ride-
sharing service.) Even EU programmes, while officially targeting broader participation than ever 
before, are difficult for a small, disruptive company to access; the barriers to entry need taking 
down. 
A special case for the knowledge market is the intellectual property regime: it needs urgent 
reform. As a general rule, private investment in knowledge should reward the investor in some 
way; that has been a principle on which every major industry of the 20th Century was built, 
from automobiles to computers. But that general rule is being challenged by new technologies, 
globalisation and the demographic trends discussed earlier. How much should a drug company be 
able to charge for, and protect, its patent on a life-saving medicine? Should a teenager streaming 
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a song without paying really constitute theft? Or, especially urgent for research, who owns data? 
You can own a database today, but not the information in it. You can patent a computer chip, 
but (at least at the European Patent Office) not the software it encodes. We have IP systems the 
basic principles of which have not changed in four centuries. And the digital world is throwing 
once-marginal controversies into the centre of our economic and social models. With the Digital 
Single Market, the EU is currently opening a door into a very important terrain of law-making, 
one where it  is critical to get the principles and the politics right, and to keep at pace with 
the development of technology. Rather than spend 30 years trying to agree on a European 
Patent, would it not have been better to redefine what a patent is, in the first place, to reflect the 
accelerating pace of technological change? We urge a new initiative to rethink the basic principles 
of intellectual property – one that opens the debate beyond the small world of IP experts, and 
includes researchers, consumers, the developing world and others.
Lastly, we should consider the impact of openness. In the scientific profession, it will be profound. 
As more citizens get involved in science – for debate, entrepreneurship, or direct participation 
– the role of the white-coated researcher is going to change. There will always be a need for 
certified experts and full-time professionals; but in other fields, such as the media and journalism, 
we have already seen how an opening of the online gates to new actors has rendered obsolescent 
the old ways of working and thinking. In science, careers will become more diverse, employment 
more precarious. At the same time, openness will also affect our institutions and regions. If 
we allow untrammelled competition, red in tooth and claw, to hit our public sector labs and 
universities, we will have many losers – more than, as a society, we are willing to accept. Here, the 
European Research Area can provide a framework for balancing open competition with regional 
and institutional support. This may seem to contradict a call for openness. But the solution lies 
with a combination of EU-level framework conditions that support enterprise and innovation, a 
highly skilled and educated population that can adapt to change – and an adequate system of 
social safeguards and regional support to correct any unwanted side-effects.
Principle 2. Flexibility and experimentation for innovation
When comparing our alternate views of 2050, we can see that with openness must come greater 
flexibility. When a new technology arises, Europe cannot go through yet another late, muddled 
response as happened in the early days of the Web. A strong knowledge system in Europe would 
be able to generate and absorb ideas quickly, foster start-ups and future Googles that would 
act on them, and train the young and old quickly to use them. It would also play on its greatest 
strength: Its diversity. That means that it would provide the means and freedom for our growing 
cities and regions to pioneer new ideas – in smart cities, education and training, culture and more. 
Let a thousand flowers bloom.
For this purpose, Europe’s regions are its gardens. They often boast excellent, dynamic universities 
and strong research infrastructures; with sufficient funding, they form ecosystems of innovation 
that attract private investment from around the world. The investment to build these ecosystems 
can already tap the regional development funds of the EU; we applaud the recent addition of 
‘strings’ to some of that funding to require it be spent on innovation-related projects. The growing 
EU focus on ‘smart city’ and other regional initiatives marrying technology with urban planning is 
also good. 
But along with this, local and national authorities must give their institutions, especially universities, 
greater autonomy. Ministries can’t teach, research or invent; they must allow freedom for those 
who can. This can be through changing national laws, or by expanding the range of funding 
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sources available to universities. The formation of partnerships with multinationals is one such 
source – but that comes with a caveat, in light of our negative vision: These partnerships need to 
bring in investment without subverting the character of the institutions. But there must be plenty 
of room for experimentation in online instruction, specialised career training, expert systems and 
artificial intelligence for education – even educational gaming. It is just possible that “the next 
Google” won’t be in search or cloud or anything we commonly expect; it could be in educational 
gaming, at a level and sophistication that would make today’s interactive gaming look antique. 
This is exactly the kind of new frontier that is ideal for a university to explore with a technology 
company – and for that, both sides need full flexibility to try, fail, and try again. We urge the 
Commission and member-states to support university/industry experimentation of this kind.
Another framework for experimentation can be provided by open innovation. The benefits of more-
open collaboration in R&D have been well documented: multinationals increasingly use expanding 
networks of research institutes, suppliers, and other partners to speed innovation cost-effectively, 
and the EU has pioneered subsidised forms of collaboration in its Framework Programmes. The 
EIT is a noteworthy example of that, stimulating open innovation in specific thematic areas, on a 
continental scale. Several Research Infrastructures, such as the DESY synchrotron in Germany and 
CERN in Geneva, have also been pioneering new open innovation methods – often in collaboration 
with universities.  
But there are many obstacles to open innovation. Confusion about intellectual property rights 
is one, mentioned earlier. Another is the lack of sufficient critical mass of world-class research 
institutions to form the core of an open innovation cluster; Europe has many but, as discussed 
earlier, its shared research infrastructure needs more support. 
Another obstacle is financial: small companies, especially those with disruptive technologies, 
are usually poor. The EU and member-states have been expanding grant and loan programmes 
for early-stage companies – but much more is needed. For a model to copy, the EU could look 
more closely at the way Norway’s SINTEF makes available infrastructure and know-how that 
SMEs cannot afford, by centralising it. There needs also to be more financial incentives for small 
enterprises to form partnerships with higher education, research institutions and societal actors. 
Why all this concern about little companies? Because entrepreneurs and SMEs are likely to be the 
main motors of city or regional development and competitiveness, given the anticipated shift to 
more self-employment and personalised service provision. 
Experimentation is also needed in social, environmental and other ‘socially constructive’ initiatives. 
As the reach of education broadens across society, new social movements are developing that 
target a multitude of issues, such as sustainable food production, engagement with disadvantaged 
groups or environmental protection. Sometimes, they take the nature of a ‘challenge’ – a goal 
to be met. While they may scale up to a European dimension, they usually start with local 
initiatives, local ideas and local energy; people tend to help those closest to home. EU and national 
governments can stimulate more of these initiatives, by naming new challenges, creating prizes, 
stimulating social crowdfunding platforms, or supporting charities that organise them by, for 
instance, providing a more favourable VAT status for foundations. The EU can further support 
these efforts in its regional development and research and innovation programmes, making social 
impact a funding criterion for a larger share of the grants and loans than at present.
As a society, to solve our most difficult problems will require bold experiments. For instance, a 
growing number of voices are pointing to a basic fallacy in our macroeconomic systems: That 
growth is ever and always good. Rather, they argue, if we are as a species to survive this century, 
we will have to shift our focus to sustainability. How? 
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Can we come up with the technological and social innovations for environmentally responsible 
lifestyles, for manufacturing that doesn’t deplete resources, for energy that doesn’t warm the 
planet? There are many possible tools for this. We can invent a new kind of EU regional fund 
focused on sustainability, rather than economic recovery and growth. We can fund economic 
research in to end-to-end accounting methodologies, incorporating indirect environmental and 
social costs and benefits. We can move beyond conventional GDP and growth indicators, to new 
sustainability or ‘well-being’ indicators. We can improve EU labelling for products and companies 
that support sustainability. This is a huge area – already much-discussed, but to which policies for 
research, education and innovation have been only haphazardly linked. Providing society with the 
knowledge to move from growth to sustainability should be a headline priority – and that requires 
systematic support for experimentation. 
Principle 3. European-level cooperation
These considerations bring us to the overall framework in which experimentation and openness 
will take place: The single market. 
For people to travel freely down a road, there must be rules to avoid collisions – and the same 
goes for the European knowledge system. The financial markets that support innovation – or, more 
often, fail to do so - need flexible but harmonised rules across Europe to work. The regulations 
that govern technology products and trade must stretch across member-state borders. Trading 
partners demand clarity of standards and interfaces across Europe. A common European approach 
to degrees and certification make it easier for people to move from one job or country to another. 
The importance of this kind of European regulatory role was illustrated in our positive and negative 
scenarios: In one case Europe guides, and in the other it falls apart. In a single market of scale, 
there needs to be some form of coordination for policy, regulation and selective and collective 
support. The specific form can vary: Sometimes more intervention, sometimes less. The individual 
cases are a matter of political choices. That’s the case today, and we believe it should continue to 
be so tomorrow. To use the commonly accepted policy phrase: Europe provides the framework 
conditions.
But the EU role goes beyond setting ground-rules only. We have suggested above a number of 
specific examples of EU ‘activism’: Support for research infrastructure, pilot initiatives for modular 
and core educational qualifications, prizes and challenges for innovators, support for regional 
innovation development. It can also scale up those local experiments that show promise in solving 
one of the biggest dilemmas we identified for 2050: How to stay employed, healthy and integrated 
into society roiled by technology, globalisation and social change. For example, it can launch a 
public education programme on making a living in a ‘sharing’ economy, or to train retirees to find 
students and markets for their skills so their years of painfully acquired knowledge isn’t lost to 
society. This could make a big difference over the next 35 years.
The EU can also lead where European scale and the public good are most intertwined – for 
instance, in the funding of fundamental research. Breakthrough science is, clearly, a public good; 
who, if not the state, would pay for fundamental discoveries like graphene, CRISPR gene-editing, 
or the Higgs Boson? The European Research Council has already demonstrated its importance as 
one important EU-scale funder. We recommend that it should be strengthened and play a greater 
important role in Europe’s scientific affairs, advising on matters of science policy and coordinating 
national, regional and local level funders of fundamental research. It can evolve to be a science 
‘hub’ for Europe. 
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Education will also need more investment – at both an EU and national level. Any leap forward, or 
backward, in European innovation will depend on our schools and universities. Today, it is widely 
understood that a generic compulsory secondary education is no longer enough. Depending upon 
the sector, different kinds of tertiary training are the new normal. In biotechnology, a minimum is 
already an MSc; soon it will be a PhD. Who will pay for this? Who will set the curricula? There will 
be a core or base qualification for higher education, and we urge the Commission to reinvigorate 
the intergovernmental Bologna process to update it. There must also be a modular structure for 
student choice, interdisciplinary learning, and the development of individualised, or personalised, 
curricula. Diversity of gender, culture and value systems also depends on our education systems: 
They must be open to young and old, native and immigrant, employed and unemployed, rich 
or poor. This takes money: Europe’s spending, nationally and regionally, on education will have 
to rise, and that will require new funding models, both public and private. The Commission can 
stimulate experimentation by supporting new, bottom-up pilots of core and modular education 
qualifications. But whatever the goal, in education it boils down to money, and the freedom to 
spend it well. The EU can support useful cooperation among member-states in this field.
The EU can also lead in another form of large-scale public good: The grand project. The US model 
of the Apollo Program is often cited as an example of what government can achieve, to mobilise 
research and inspire citizens; but the European Space Agency’s recent scientific and PR success 
with its Rosetta mission is a timely reminder that Europe can play that game, too. In Horizon 
2020, the Commission has launched a few ‘flagship’ programmes intended to inspire; they have 
yet to do so. We urge a bottom-up effort to identify some truly inspiring Grand Projects, with a 
2050 horizon, that can be simply described and directly relevant to all citizens. For instance:
•  Ban Dementia: Target a cure or prevention for Alzheimer’s by 2050
•  Sustainable Europe: Invent the society, not just technology, to be self-sustaining by 2050
•  Epidemic Busters: Target the eradication of all infectious diseases by 2050
We list these simply by way of illustration. Some would build on existing EU initiatives, such as the 
flagship brain project. All are of a grand scale and inspiring nature. All involve multiple disciplines 
and actors: the sustainability project, for instance, would require a level of social sciences and 
humanities research that has never been attempted. It would have to integrate societal voices 
on a regular basis, find new ways to support collaboration among civil society organisations, and 
educate all citizens. In essence, a challenge such as this isn’t so much about citizen science or 
technological fixes; it’s about permitting all Europeans to make and express their own choices – to 
co-develop their visions of tomorrow. In all these grand projects, our general point is that, if the 
EU is to matter in the knowledge system, it must be bolder, smarter and better-connected with 
the fears and hopes of its citizens. It must involve all of us. It must inspire.
One final important role for the EU is the articulation of European positions towards global problems, 
and a coordination of the participation of its member-states in international research efforts to 
address these global problems. There is no area where this is more evident than in global climate 
change. European leadership in environmental responsibility represents an important direction 
for the future of Europe, one that enables appropriate choices between alternative technological 
directions, and provides for economic and innovation models that can bring sustainability to the 
world, and wellbeing to the people of Europe. 
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The challenges ahead: funding and the tax base
Accelerating technological change is likely to change the employment situation of most people. 
Companies rise and fall at an increasing pace and the automation of many functions risks 
making many occupations redundant; already, to cite one small example, we see technology 
driving conventional post-carriers into retirement. Will automation increase total unemployment? 
Optimists point to the experience with previous technological transitions in which new professions 
were created even as old ones died. Pessimists argue that there has not been another transition 
like this one.  However, there is no doubt that jobs will move around faster than people, and that 
countries and regions will have to deal with unemployment situations which may be temporary or 
may become a structural feature of our societies in the near future. 
This raises challenges for higher education, which would have to bear the weight of retraining 
people to re-enter employment or enterprise. The greatest challenge will be to prevent long-
term unemployment from leading to discontent and social disintegration - the key trigger for 
the negative scenario. Publicly funded higher education may need, in the near future, to expand 
massively towards lifelong learning for social integration, rather than purely for reskilling. 
Stimulating curiosity about science and technology through higher education should be a function 
that is encouraged in education systems in Europe.  
At the risk of repeating ourselves: We must spend more on research and education. The private 
sector can do much, but it, too, depends on public goods: An educated population, a skilled workforce, 
fundamental knowledge, breakthrough discoveries. Public funding shortfalls will trigger shrinkage 
of our science and education base. One might argue this is just an inevitable rationalisation of 
our knowledge-generating industries – a kind of market-based privatisation of formerly public 
functions, such as rail service or health insurance in some countries. But knowledge labour is 
different. It is extremely mobile. Countries compete for talented scientists and engineers.  Current 
and near-term funding shortfalls in Europe can send waves of skilled migrants towards the US 
and China, and aggravate the challenges posed by globalisation in Europe in the medium and 
long term. Funding shortfalls and brain-drain are important triggers of our negative scenario. But 
this isn’t just another plea for public cash; we wish to highlight the solution that has, so far, been 
outside the conventional run of research or education budget debate. 
To safeguard public funding, Europe needs to safeguard its tax base. The connection between 
healthy treasuries and healthy universities and labs is obvious to most of us – but often, it 
appears, not to policy makers. One threat to that tax base is in headlines today: the tax-avoidance 
behaviour of many multinationals. Large companies, able to move their profits at will across the 
globe, are skilled at shopping for the most favourable tax venues; while some EU member-states 
have proven adept at playing that game, the EU overall, with its high social charges, is bound to 
be a net loser in a global market for tax holidays. It should wish to see this better regulated. In 
part, this is an informational problem: It’s impossible for individual governments to grasp the full 
picture of what a multinational is doing. Cooperation among tax authorities, within and without the 
EU, is on the rise. Another worthwhile EU-inspired, Big Data initiative could be creating systems to 
better monitor cross-border commerce and taxation by large companies – another new direction 
for the EU Framework Programmes (and one that might win friends in Europe’s finance ministries.) 
There is also an economic reason for linking fiscal and research policies. A good knowledge-
production system, sooner or later, produces economic growth, jobs, and tax revenues. It also 
produces a more educated, better-informed electorate. Citizens who don’t understand or are 
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daunted by the 2050 world of fast-evolving science and technology will find the economy a 
rotten place to be. Innovation will be brought about by others; our citizens will find it harder to get 
a job, find housing, get cured or obtain what we regard as the minimum requirements for a good 
life. Our treasuries will empty, and the entire system break down. We are recommending a natural 
and gradual tightening of the links between fiscal policy and policy for research, innovation and 
education. If there is one ‘big idea’ from our work, it would be this. 
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In conclusion
Europe’s greatest strength is in its diversity: Its mind-boggling profusion of languages, cultures, 
religions and opinions; of universities, laboratories and companies; of institutions, foundations and 
organisations; of villages, cities, regions and nation-states. 
Despite this diversity, however, most of us do share some common values; it is what makes a Eu-
ropean, well, European. They include our sense of openness – to new ideas and peoples; whether 
in government or commerce or culture, we rebel against any kind of imposed uniformity. There 
is our belief in égalité and social solidarity; that we have a responsibility to the well-being of our 
fellow-citizens, and to ensure that there is equality of opportunity, at the least, for all. As well, 
there is our deep support for the rights of the individual – to speak freely, worship or think freely, 
move about Europe freely. More recently in our history, we have also developed a common sense 
of the importance of sustainability: to preserve the planet and its life for future generations. Our 
scenarios of 2050 are, at root, premised on how well we do or do not sustain these fundamental 
European values. They should guide our policy choices today.
There is also another kind of value built into us all: The value that we, as Europeans, place on 
knowledge in all its forms: in research, education, innovation. In the meritocratic society we aspire 
to – but may not always achieve – what you know helps define who you are. Thus, the system 
for creating, conveying and applying knowledge is core to our being as Europeans. It is a complex 
policy area unlike any other – cutting across disciplines, regions, sectors and ministries. 
Our two visions of 2050 were not meant as forecasts; they are projections of what Europe could 
look like in 2050 if it does, or doesn’t, manage its system of knowledge transformation well. We 
urge speedy action by EU leaders – starting with those in the European institutions who supervise 
knowledge policies in their many forms. Thirty-five years may seem like a long way in the future. 
But taking the steps now, to ensure a bright future, will also pay back immediately to our prospe-
rity, health and happiness right now. 
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